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CHEROKEE COUNTY • CJ-2026-00057

Jonathon M. Tubby v. Arvest Bank

Filed: Mar 16, 2026
Type: CJ

What's This Case About?

Let’s be real: how many of us have sat in a bank, signing papers we barely read, trusting that the smiling loan officer isn’t selling us a financial time bomb disguised as “peace of mind”? Well, Jonathon Tubby thought he was buying protection when he financed his 2019 Dodge Ram through Arvest Bank and added an “Easy Street Coverage” extended warranty. Instead, he got a legal war against a bank, two warranty companies, and what appears to be a well-oiled machine of corporate runaround—over a Hemi engine tick. Yes, the Hemi tick. You know the one—famous among Dodge enthusiasts, whispered about in forums, the kind of thing that makes grown men weep into their torque wrenches. But this isn’t just about a faulty engine. This is about promises made, promises broken, and a man who said, “Oh hell no,” and sued everyone.

Jonathon M. Tubby, a resident of Cherokee County, Oklahoma, bought a Dodge Ram because, well, that’s what you do when you live in Oklahoma and need something that can haul, tow, and survive a dust storm without blinking. He financed it through Arvest Bank, a familiar name in Oklahoma banking, the kind of institution that also sells you socks and coffee mugs at the drive-thru. But during the financing process, something extra got slipped into the deal: an extended vehicle service contract, branded as “Easy Street Coverage.” It wasn’t just an add-on—it was sold as a safety net. According to Tubby, the Arvest employee, Colleen Williams, made big, shiny promises: this warranty would cover “big ticket items,” including a new engine if needed, and would be “comparable to factory warranty coverage.” That’s music to any truck owner’s ears. Who wouldn’t want that? So Tubby paid the premiums, signed the paperwork, and drove off believing he was covered. Spoiler: he wasn’t. Not really.

Fast forward, and the dreaded Hemi tick shows up—no surprise there. Dodge owners know this rattle is often the sound of impending doom, a sign of lifter failure, metal shavings in the oil, and a ticking (pun intended) time bomb in the engine bay. Diagnostics on Tubby’s truck revealed metal flakes and other red flags—exactly the kind of damage that, according to manufacturer service bulletins, should trigger a full engine replacement. So Tubby did what any reasonable, warranty-holding person would do: he filed a claim. He didn’t ask for a moon roof or free oil changes. He asked for a new engine, as promised.

But here’s where the plot takes a Wild West turn. Instead of approving the replacement, the warranty administrators—Route 66 Extended Warranty Company and ASC Auto Services Company—offered him a used engine. Not new. Not factory-spec. Used. And to add insult to mechanical injury, they allegedly told him that if he insisted on a new engine, it would void the transmission coverage under the same warranty. Let that sink in. You’re being told that asking for the thing you paid for—new parts, full coverage—will somehow cost you protection on another major component. It’s like buying an all-inclusive vacation package and being told you can’t eat at the buffet because you requested a room with a view.

Tubby, bless his stubborn heart, refused to accept this bait-and-switch. He pushed back. He demanded what was promised. And when that didn’t work, he tried to follow the rules. The warranty had a dispute resolution clause: mediation first, then arbitration. So he agreed. He showed up—well, metaphorically—to the mediation table. But Arvest refused to attend. Route 66 cancelled the session at the last minute. And in a move that sounds like something out of a bad reality TV contract dispute, Route 66 allegedly processed a claim without his consent, further muddying the waters and making it look like they were trying to strong-arm a resolution while avoiding accountability.

Now, let’s talk about what Tubby is actually suing for—because he didn’t hold back. He’s throwing the entire legal kitchen sink at these companies. His petition includes eleven distinct claims. Eleven! He’s accusing the warranty companies of breach of contract for not delivering the new engine they promised. He’s claiming breach of good faith—basically, that they handled his claim like a shady game of hot potato. He’s alleging fraud against Arvest for selling him a warranty with promises they knew were hollow. There’s negligent misrepresentation, consumer protection violations, promissory estoppel (a fancy way of saying “you promised, I believed, now honor it”), and even civil conspiracy—yes, he thinks all these companies were in cahoots, running a scam where they sell shiny warranties and then deny claims with a smirk.

He’s also challenging the arbitration clause—the “you must mediate before suing” rule—arguing that by refusing to mediate, the defendants waived their right to enforce it. It’s a classic “you can’t have your cake and eat it too” argument: you can’t skip the mediation and then turn around and say, “Hey, you didn’t mediate, so you can’t sue.”

So what does Tubby want? Officially, he’s asking for over $10,000 in damages—though that feels almost quaint given the emotional toll and legal firepower involved. But money isn’t the main point. He wants specific performance: a court order forcing the warranty companies to actually give him a new engine, as promised. He wants declaratory judgment—a legal stamp saying, “Yes, this warranty covers a new engine, and no, it doesn’t void transmission coverage.” He wants injunctive relief to stop them from blocking the repair. He wants punitive damages—not because he’s greedy, but because he wants to slap these companies upside the head for their bad behavior. He wants attorneys’ fees, interest, restitution—basically, he wants to win so hard that it echoes.

Now, is $10,000 a lot for a botched engine replacement? On paper, maybe not. A new Hemi engine can cost $8,000 to $12,000 alone, not counting labor. But this case isn’t really about the dollar amount. It’s about principle. It’s about the fact that a bank—a bank—is selling insurance-like products with promises it can’t—or won’t—keep. It’s about companies using fine print and arbitration clauses to dodge accountability. It’s about a man who trusted the system and got handed a used engine and a middle finger.

Our take? The most absurd part isn’t even the used engine. It’s that Arvest Bank, an Oklahoma financial institution, is allegedly deep in the business of selling warranties with promises they have no intention of honoring. Since when did banks become snake-oil salesmen? And the idea that you can lose transmission coverage for demanding a new engine—that’s not a policy. That’s extortion. We’re rooting for Tubby. Not because he’s perfect, but because he’s the little guy who said, “Wait a minute, that’s not what you told me,” and had the guts to file a 20-page legal grenade in response. In a world where corporations bury us in fine print and customer service bots, sometimes the most heroic thing you can do is refuse to accept “used” when you paid for “new.” And if that means dragging a bank and two warranty companies to court over a Hemi tick? So be it. Justice may be blind, but it shouldn’t be deaf to the sound of a failing engine—and a man who just wants what he was promised.

Case Overview

$10,000 Demand Jury Trial Petition
Jurisdiction
District Court in and for Cherokee County, Oklahoma
Relief Sought
$10,000 Monetary
$1 Punitive
Injunctive Relief
Declaratory Relief
Plaintiffs
Claims
# Cause of Action Description
1 Breach of Contract Defendants failed to provide promised coverage under the Service Contract
2 Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Defendants engaged in bad faith claims handling practices
3 Fraudulent Inducement Defendants made false representations regarding the Service Contract
4 Negligence Misrepresentation Defendants supplied false information regarding the Service Contract
5 Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act Defendants engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices
6 Promissory Estoppel Defendants made clear and definite promises regarding the Service Contract
7 Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief Defendants' conduct breached contractual and legal duties owed to Plaintiff
8 Unjust Enrichment/Restitution Defendants accepted and retained benefits under the Service Contract without providing promised coverage
9 Negligence Hiring, Training, Supervision, and Retention Defendants failed to exercise reasonable care in hiring, training, and supervising sales personnel
10 Civil Conspiracy/Aiding and Abetting Defendants acted in concert to market the Service Contract and then deny or limit claims
11 Violations of the Oklahoma Insurance Code/Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Defendants engaged in bad faith and/or negligent claims handling practices

Petition Text

2,702 words
IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CHEROKEE COUNTY STATE OF OKLAHOMA JONATHON TUBBY, Plaintiff, vs. ARVEST BANK, ROUTE 66 EXTENDED WARRANTY COMPANY, and ASC AUTO SERVICES COMPANY, INC. Defendants. PETITION Plaintiff, Jonathon M. Tubby ("Plaintiff" or "Mr. Tubby"), for his claims against Defendants Arvest Bank ("Arvest"), Route 66 Extended Warranty Company ("Route 66"), and ASC Auto Services Company Inc. ("ASC") (collectively, "Defendants"), alleges as follows: I. PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 1. Plaintiff is a resident of Cherokee County, State of Oklahoma, and at all relevant times was the owner of a 2019 Dodge Ram equipped with a HEMI engine (the "Vehicle"). 2. Defendant Arvest is an Oklahoma banking corporation authorized to do business in Oklahoma, with operations and agents in Cherokee County, Oklahoma, and, upon information and belief, participated in the sale and financing of an extended warranty/service contract to Plaintiff in Cherokee County. 3. Colleen Williams is, upon information and belief, an individual resident of Oklahoma and at all relevant times an Arvest employee or agent who sold and/or facilitated the sale of an extended warranty/service contract to Plaintiff in Cherokee County. 4. Defendant Route 66 is, upon information and belief, a business entity authorized to do business in Oklahoma and engaged in the marketing, administration, and/or obligation of vehicle service contracts sold in Oklahoma, including the contract sold to Plaintiff. 5. Defendant ASC is, upon information and belief, a business entity and the administrator and/or obligor of the service contract at issue, doing business in Oklahoma. 6. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court because the events and transactions giving rise to these claims occurred in Oklahoma, the Defendants conduct business in Oklahoma, and Plaintiff resides in Cherokee County, Oklahoma. 7. Venue is proper in Cherokee County pursuant to 12 O.S. § 134 and/or § 137 because Defendants may be found in this county and/or the cause of action arose in whole or in part in this county. II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS 8. In connection with purchasing and financing the Vehicle, Plaintiff purchased an extended warranty/service contract branded and/or described as “Easy Street Coverage” (the “Service Contract”) through Arvest. 9. Arvest and Williams marketed and sold the Service Contract to Plaintiff, representing and assuring that the coverage would include major repairs such as a new engine, cover “big ticket items,” and provide coverage comparable to factory warranty coverage. Plaintiff reasonably relied on these representations. 10. The Service Contract was administered and/or underwritten by Route 66 and/or ASC, who received premiums, assumed obligations, and undertook to repair, replace, or pay for covered repairs during the contract term. 11. After purchase, the Vehicle developed the well-known “HEMI Tick” defect. Manufacturer information and service bulletins identify conditions under which the HEMI engine requires replacement. Diagnostics on Plaintiff’s Vehicle revealed metal flakes and other indicators consistent with the bulletin’s criteria for engine replacement. 12. Plaintiff submitted a claim to Route 66/ASC under the Service Contract requesting a new engine replacement consistent with the manufacturer bulletin and the represented coverage. 13. Route 66/ASC refused to authorize a new engine and instead offered a used engine replacement, which Plaintiff contends is inadequate, not equivalent, and inconsistent with the Service Contract’s promises and the representations made at the time of sale. 14. Route 66/ASC further asserted that installing a new engine would void or eliminate coverage for the transmission under the Service Contract, a position not supported by the contract’s plain language and contrary to representations that coverage was for “big ticket items” comparable to factory warranty coverage. 15. The Service Contract contains a dispute resolution clause purporting to require mediation followed by arbitration. Plaintiff honored the contract by agreeing to mediate. 16. Mediation was scheduled. Arvest refused to attend. Route 66 cancelled the mediation at the last minute. Around that time, Route 66 allegedly processed a claim without Plaintiff’s consent, further complicating and prejudicing Plaintiff’s rights and remedies. 17. By refusing to attend or cancelling mediation, and by processing a claim without consent, Defendants materially breached or waived the ADR preconditions and any right to compel arbitration, and/or are estopped from enforcing the ADR provisions. 18. Defendants’ conduct includes deceptive sales practices by Arvest/Williams and improper, unreasonable, and bad faith claims handling by Route 66/ASC. 19. Upon information and belief, Route 66/ASC has a pattern or practice of similar denials, limitations, and tactics in Oklahoma and elsewhere. 20. Plaintiff has complied with all conditions precedent or they have been excused or waived by Defendants’ conduct. 21. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ acts and omissions, Plaintiff has suffered damages including but not limited to: out-of-pocket expenses; the loss of the benefit of the bargain; diminished value and/or loss of use of the Vehicle; costs associated with diagnosis and attempted repairs; time and inconvenience; emotional distress; and attorneys’ fees and costs as permitted by law. Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages based on Defendants’ intentional, reckless, and/or malicious conduct. III. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF COUNT I – BREACH OF CONTRACT (Against Route 66 and ASC) 22. The Service Contract is a valid, enforceable agreement supported by consideration. Plaintiff paid premiums and complied with his obligations. 23. Route 66/ASC breached the Service Contract by, among other things: • Failing and refusing to authorize a new engine replacement when the Vehicle satisfied manufacturer bulletin criteria and contract coverage for major engine failures; • Imposing limitations not found in the Service Contract, including claiming that a new engine would void or reduce transmission coverage; • Offering an inferior used engine in lieu of the required new engine replacement. 25. Plaintiff was damaged as a direct and proximate result of the breaches. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, specific performance (authorization of a new engine), consequential damages, costs, interest, and all other relief available at law or in equity. COUNT II – BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING / INSURANCE BAD FAITH (Against Route 66 and ASC) 26. Under Oklahoma law, insurers and entities engaged in the business of insurance, including those administering and obligating vehicle service agreements that function as insurance for covered repairs, owe insureds a duty of good faith and fair dealing. See, e.g., Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978); Badillo v. Mid Century Ins. Co., 121 P.3d 1080 (Okla. 2005); McCorkle v. Great Atlantic Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583 (Okla. 1981). 27. Route 66/ASC owed Plaintiff a duty to timely, fairly, and reasonably investigate, evaluate, and pay the claim. 28. Route 66/ASC breached their duty by, among other things: • Unreasonably denying or limiting coverage; • Ignoring manufacturer criteria and objective evidence warranting a new engine; • Misrepresenting policy terms (e.g., asserting that selecting a new engine would void transmission coverage); • Failing to promptly, fairly, and equitably attempt to settle the claim where liability was reasonably clear; • Cancelling scheduled mediation and processing a claim without Plaintiff’s consent; • Engaging in claims practices designed to coerce acceptance of inferior repairs and deprive Plaintiff of the benefits of the contract. 30. Route 66/ASC’s conduct was unreasonable, in reckless disregard of Plaintiff’s rights, and/or intentional and malicious. 31. As a proximate result, Plaintiff suffered financial loss, inconvenience, and emotional distress. Plaintiff seeks actual damages, damages for emotional distress, punitive damages under 23 O.S. § 9.1, attorneys’ fees and costs where permitted, interest, and all other appropriate relief. COUNT III – FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT / FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION (Against Arvest) 32. Arvest and Williams made material representations of fact, including that the Service Contract would cover major repairs such as a new engine, cover “big ticket items,” and provide coverage comparable to factory warranty coverage. 33. These representations were false or were made recklessly without knowledge of their truth or falsity; Arvest and Williams knew or should have known of the limitations Defendants later asserted and that a used engine would not be equivalent to coverage comparable to a factory warranty. 34. Arvest and Williams intended for Plaintiff to rely on these representations to induce the purchase of the Service Contract. 35. Plaintiff reasonably relied to his detriment by purchasing the Service Contract. 36. Plaintiff suffered damages as a proximate result, including premiums paid, loss of benefit of the bargain, and consequential losses. 37. Plaintiff seeks rescission and restitution in the alternative, actual damages, incidental and consequential damages, punitive damages, interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees as permitted by law. COUNT IV – NEGLIGENCE MISREPRESENTATION (Against Arvest and Williams) 39. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1–38. 40. Arvest and Williams, in the course of their business, supplied false information regarding the nature and scope of coverage, failed to exercise reasonable care in obtaining or communicating accurate information about the Service Contract, and failed to disclose material limitations. 41. Plaintiff justifiably relied on the information, resulting in pecuniary loss. 42. Plaintiff seeks actual damages, interest, costs, and all other relief deemed just and proper. COUNT V – OKLAHOMA CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (OCPA), 15 O.S. § 751 et seq. (Against All Defendants) 43. Plaintiff is a consumer; Defendants are suppliers within the meaning of the OCPA. 44. Defendants engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices, including but not limited to: • Misrepresenting the benefits, characteristics, uses, and quality of the Service Contract (15 O.S. § 753); • Failing to disclose material facts known at the time of sale; • Misrepresenting terms, conditions, or benefits of the Service Contract and claims handling; • Making representations that the Service Contract conferred rights or remedies it did not have or that were later negated. 46. Defendants’ conduct was a producing cause of Plaintiff’s damages. 47. Plaintiff seeks actual damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 15 O.S. § 761.1, pre- and post-judgment interest, and punitive damages as appropriate. COUNT VI – PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL (Against Arvest and Williams; and in the alternative Against Route 66/ASC) 48. Arvest and Williams made clear and definite promises that the Service Contract would cover major repairs, including a new engine, comparable to factory warranty coverage. Route 66/ASC, by issuing, administering, and benefiting from the Service Contract and marketing materials, adopted, ratified, or should be estopped to deny those promises. 49. Plaintiff reasonably relied on these promises to his detriment by purchasing the Service Contract and foregoing other options. 50. Injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promises. Plaintiff seeks enforcement of the promises (including authorization of a new engine replacement) or damages measured by his reliance and expectation interests. COUNT VII – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (Against All Defendants) 52. An actual, justiciable controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendants regarding: • The scope of coverage under the Service Contract, including whether a new engine replacement is required and whether such replacement affects transmission coverage; • The enforceability, unconscionability, waiver, and/or estoppel of the ADR provisions, given Defendants’ refusal to mediate, last-minute cancellation, and claim processing without consent; • The adequacy and equivalence of a used engine replacement under the Service Contract. 54. Plaintiff seeks declarations that: • The Service Contract requires Defendants to authorize and pay for a new engine replacement consistent with manufacturer criteria and that such replacement does not void or diminish transmission coverage; • The ADR provisions are void, unconscionable, illusory, waived, and/or stopped from enforcement by Defendants’ conduct, and that this action may proceed in court; • Defendants’ conduct breached contractual and legal duties owed to Plaintiff. 55. Plaintiff also seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief compelling authorization and payment for a new engine replacement as specified, and enjoining Defendants from enforcing ADR provisions or otherwise interfering with Plaintiff’s rights under the Service Contract during this litigation. COUNT VIII – UNJUST ENRICHMENT / RESTITUTION (IN THE ALTERNATIVE) (Against Route 66 and ASC; and in the alternative Against Arvest) 56. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1–55. 57. Plaintiff conferred benefits (premium payments and associated consideration) on Defendants. Defendants accepted and retained those benefits while failing to provide the promised coverage and benefits, making retention unjust. 58. Plaintiff seeks restitution of all amounts paid, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, and all other equitable relief as the Court deems just, in the alternative to contract damages. COUNT IX – NEGLIGENCE HIRING, TRAINING, SUPERVISION, AND RETENTION (Against Arvest; and in the alternative Against Route 66/ASC) 59. Arvest owed Plaintiff a duty to exercise reasonable care in hiring, training, supervising, and retaining its sales personnel, including Williams, to ensure accurate, non-misleading representations regarding coverage. 60. Arvest breached its duty by failing to train and supervise Williams and by adopting sales scripts and practices that misrepresented coverage. 61. Alternatively, Route 66/ASC owed a duty to ensure that agents and sellers of the Service Contract accurately described coverage and did not mislead consumers, and they breached that duty. 62. As a result, Plaintiff suffered damages and seeks all relief allowable at law. COUNT X – CIVIL CONSPIRACY / AIDING AND ABETTING (Against All Defendants) 64. Defendants acted in concert pursuant to an agreement or common design to market the Service Contract as providing comprehensive coverage comparable to factory warranty coverage and then to deny or limit claims to inferior used components, thereby depriving consumers of the benefit of the bargain. 65. Defendants knowingly aided and abetted each other's tortious conduct and misrepresentations and benefitted financially from the scheme. 66. Plaintiff suffered damages as a proximate result and seeks joint and several liability, actual damages, punitive damages, and equitable relief. COUNT XI – VIOLATIONS OF THE OKLAHOMA INSURANCE CODE / UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES (EVIDENCE OF BAD FAITH AND/OR NEGLIGENCE PER SE) (Against Route 66 and ASC) 68. Route 66/ASC’s claims handling practices, including misrepresenting policy provisions, failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for prompt investigation, and failing to attempt in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements where liability is reasonably clear, violate Oklahoma’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices standards, 36 O.S. § 1250.1 et seq. 69. While Plaintiff acknowledges that the statute does not create an independent private right of action, such violations constitute evidence of bad faith and/or negligence per se supporting Plaintiff’s claims. 70. Plaintiff seeks all relief available under his tort and contract claims, including punitive damages. IV. ARBITRATION/MEDIATION PROVISIONS: WAIVER, UNENFORCEABILITY, AND ESTOPPEL 72. The ADR provision in the Service Contract is unenforceable and/or waived because: • Arvest refused to attend the scheduled mediation and Route 66 cancelled it at the last minute, preventing satisfaction of preconditions and frustrating the process; • Defendants processed a claim without Plaintiff's consent, prejudicing Plaintiff and acting inconsistently with any intent to arbitrate in good faith; • The ADR provision is unconscionable and/or illusory to the extent it unfairly limits consumer remedies, imposes asymmetric obligations, or fails to preserve meaningful relief; • Defendants are estopped from enforcement due to their conduct. 74. Plaintiff seeks an order declaring the ADR provision unenforceable, waived, or estopped and allowing this action to proceed in court. V. DAMAGES 75. Plaintiff seeks the following categories of damages and relief: • Compensatory damages, including benefit-of-the-bargain and consequential damages; • Restitution and disgorgement, in the alternative; • Specific performance and injunctive relief requiring authorization and payment for a new engine replacement consistent with manufacturer criteria and contract obligations; • Damages for emotional distress associated with bad faith; • Punitive damages under 23 O.S. § 9.1; • Attorneys' fees and costs as permitted by law, including under the OCPA; • Pre- and post-judgment interest as permitted by law; • Declaratory judgment relief as set forth above; • All other relief, legal and equitable, to which Plaintiff may be entitled. VI. JURY DEMAND 76. Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests judgment in his favor and against Defendants, jointly and severally where permitted, awarding: 1. Compensatory damages in an amount in excess of $10,000 2. Specific performance compelling Route 66/ASC to authorize and pay for a new engine replacement consistent with manufacturer criteria and the Service Contract; 3. Declaratory and injunctive relief as pleaded; 4. Restitution/disgorgement in the alternative; 5. Punitive damages; 6. Attorneys' fees and costs as allowed by law (including 15 O.S. § 761.1); 7. Pre- and post-judgment interest at the statutory rate; and 8. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. Dated: December 8, 2025 Respectfully submitted, Brian E. Duke, OBA # 14710 DUKE LAW FIRM, PLLC 133 N. Muskogee Ave., Suite G Tahlequah, OK 74464 [email protected] TEL: 918-456-0860 FAX: 918-416-6470 VERIFICATION STATE OF OKLAHOMA ) COUNTY OF CHEROKEE ) ss. Jonathon Tubby, being of lawful age, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: that he is the Petitioner herein, that he has read and knows the contents of the within and foregoing document and that the statements therein contained are true and correct. Jonathon Tubby Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8th day of December, 2025. Notary Public State of Oklahoma Brian Duke My Commission # 23002246 Expires 2/15/2027 Notary Public eSignature Details Signer ID: Aot3Gb5yGYsHcK6WMyGXgW8X Signed by: Jonathon M Tubby Sent to email: [email protected] IP Address: 12.75.8.89 Signed at: Dec 8 2025, 12:48 am CST
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