Clifton Dewane Wilson and Freda Unterkircher Wilson, as Trustees of the Clifton and Freda Wilson Revocable Trust v. Thomas W. Edwards and Rebecca M. Edwards

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF MAJOR COUNTY STATE OF OKLAHOMA CLIFTON DEWANE WILSON and FREDA UNTERKIRCHER WILSON, as Trustees of the Clifton and Freda Wilson Revocable Trust. Plaintiffs, vs. THOMAS W. EDWARDS; and REBECCA M. EDWARDS Defendants. PETITION TO QUIET TITLE COMES NOW, the Plaintiff’s, Clifton Dewane Wilson and Freda Unterkircher Wilson, as Trustees of the Clifton and Freda Wilson Revocable Trust, by and through their counsel of record Stephen Jones, William Jewell and Blake Trekell of JONES, OTJEN & JEWELL and brings their Petition to Quiet Title concerning their right to an easement over the surface of the real property belonging to the Defendants, Thomas W. Edwards and Rebecca M. Edwards, in the Northeast Quarter (NE/4) and the North Half of the Southeast Quarter (N/2 SE/4) of Section 29, Township Twenty-One (21), Range Fourteen (14) W. I. M. in Major County, Oklahoma, and in support thereof states and asserts as follows: JURISDICTION AND VENUE Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations and statements and further alleges as follows: 1. The real property that is subject to these proceedings is located in Major County, Oklahoma. Therefore, venue is proper in this Court only under 12 O.S. § 131. 2. All the parties to this proceeding are domiciled in Major County, Oklahoma. FACTS Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations and statements and further alleges as follows: 3. The Southeast Quarter (SE/4), the South Half of the Northeast Quarter (S/2 NE/4) and the Northwest Quarter (NW/4) of Section Twenty-Eight (28), Township Twenty-One (21) Range Fourteen (14) W.I.M in Major County, Oklahoma and the Northeast Quarter (NE/4) and the North Half of the Southeast Quarter (N/2 SE/4) of Section Twenty-Nine (29), Township Twenty-One (21), Range Fourteen (14) W.I.M. in Major County, Oklahoma are all contiguous parcels of property which were all commonly owned, along with other contiguous tracts not subject to this action, by the Walter L. Corwin Family Inter Vivos Revocable Trust as evidenced by the Walter L. Corwin Family Inter Vivos Revocable Trust Agreement filed in the Major County Court Clerk’s office in Book 731 Page 161 of the official records of the Major County Clerk, which is incorporated into this pleading an attached hereto as Exhibit 1. Ex. 1. These tracts are the subject of this action and will be the tracts referred to throughout this pleading in shortened or abbreviated terms. 4. An oil lease road has serviced an oil well, named the “Corwin “A””, well number 5-28, which is located in approximately the center of the Northwest Quarter (NW/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28), since the well’s completion on or about May 12, 1984. Exhibit 2, incorporated and attached to this pleading, is a copy of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission completion report showing the well was completed on May 12, 1984. Ex. 2. Exhibit 3, incorporated and attached to this pleading, is an aerial photograph with the Plaintiff’s property within Section Twenty-eight (28) outlined, generally. Ex. 3. Also, circled on Exhibit 3 is the “Corwin “A”” 5-28 well in the Northwest Quarter (NW/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28). Ex. 3. The oil lease road enters the Northwest Quarter (NW/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28) in the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter (SW/4 NW/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28). 5. This oil lease road has serviced the the “Corwin “A”” 5-28 well since its completion in 1984. This lease road begins when the north/south county-maintained road ends. The county-maintained road runs north/south along the Southeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter (SE/4 SE/4) of Section Twenty-nine (29) and the Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter (SW/4 SW/4) of Section 28 (28) approximately one quarter (1/4) of a mile north before it terminates and turns into the aforementioned oil lease road on Defendants’ property (although Defendants have also locked a gate blocking off a portion of the public road easement). The two (2) deeds filed in the official records of the Major County Clerk’s office at Book 1274, Page 196 and Book 1274, Page 198 conveying the public road easement are attached hereto as Exhibits 4 and 5. The county road ends where the Northeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter (NE/4 SE/4) of Section Twenty-nine (29) begins. This parcel was once a part of the contiguous parcel of land owned by the Walter L. Corwin Family Inter Vivos Revocable Trust and was used to access the Northwest Quarter (NW/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28), now owned by Plaintiffs. 6. Undoubtedly, the mineral development companies chose this road and this route to the “Corwin “A”” 5-28 well in the Northwest Quarter (NW/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28) for obvious reasons. There is no county road access to the Northwest Quarter (NW/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28). The topography of Section Twenty-eight (28) is such that travel from the South half (S/2), especially the Plaintiffs’ Southeast Quarter (SW/4), to the Plaintiffs’ Northwest Quarter (NW/4) is difficult or impossible. Ex. 3. 7. The Cheyenne Creek, a long existing creek, runs across Section Twenty-eight (28) from the Southwest Quarter (SW/4) to the Northeast Quarter (NE/4), cutting diagonally up across the Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter (NW/4 SE/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28), and then flowing into the Southeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (SE/4 NE/4), taking a northerly bend and running north out of Section Twenty-eight (28) through the North section line of the Northeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (NE/4 NE/4). 8. The Cheyenne creek lays low in the bottom of a canyon. Both sides of the canyon consist of steep rugged gypsum canyon walls. Id. This Creek, canyon, and feeder canyons divide access from the Southeast Quarter (SE/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28) to the Northwest Quarter (NW/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28). Id. Passage from the Southeast Quarter (SE/4) to the Northwest Quarter (NW/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28) is difficult in a four-wheel drive pickup alone, often impossible. Plaintiffs and others have used the oil lease road to access the Northwest Quarter (NW/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28) for decades. 9. On May 23, 1992, the Walter L. Corwin Family Inter Vivos Revocable Trust property sold at auction and was divided into different tracts. Ex. 6. The Defendants purchased, relevant to this action, among other portions of the contiguous tract, the North Half of the Southeast Quarter (N/2 SE/4) and the Northeast Quarter (NE/4) of Section Twenty-nine (29), Township Twenty-one (21) North, Range Fourteen (14), W.I.M., Major County, Oklahoma. See Exhibit 7, which is the deed conveying the property to the Defendants. Ex. 7. The property is still held according to this deed. Id. This is the property that the above-mentioned oil lease road runs along the East side of. 10. Plaintiff Clifton Wilson purchased at the same auction the Northwest Quarter (NW/4) and the Southeast Quarter (SE/4) and the South Half of the Northeast Quarter (S/2 NE/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28), Township Twenty-one (21) North, Range Fourteen (14), W.I.M., Major County, Oklahoma. The Deed to Plaintiff Clifton Wilson, which was executed by the same parties and on the same day as the aforementioned deed conveying the neighboring part of the property to the Defendants, is attached as Exhibit 8. Ex.8. Part of this property, the NW/4, is accessed by the oil lease road aforementioned that runs along the Defendant’s property. 11. The tract purchased by Plaintiff Clifton Wilson is now held by the Clifton and Freda Wilson Revocable Trust with Plaintiff’s as trustees. Ex. 9. 12. Since the property was divided over thirty (30) years ago the Plaintiffs have openly used the oilfield road crossing the property that the Defendants purchased to access the back part of their property, the Northwest Quarter (NW/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28). Plaintiffs have raised hay in an area of grass in the Northwest Quarter (NW/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28). This requires fertilizing and spraying equipment to access that area of their property, as well as baling, swathing and other equipment used to haul hay out of the field. There is one water well on the Northwest Quarter (NW/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28) that has to be monitored regularly. It is the main source of drinking water for cattle grazing within the approximately one hundred and sixty (160) acres within Northwest Quarter (NW/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28) and supplies water to two (2) separate tanks for cattle to drink from. Without access over the lease road to the Northwest Quarter (NW/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28) Plaintiffs cannot graze or hay their property, which is the lands sole useful purpose to the Plaintiffs. 13. The Plaintiffs have used the lease road regularly and without interruption over the last approximately thirty (30) years since they purchased the property in Section Twenty-eight (28) and the time of the division of the Walter L. Corwin Family Inter Vivos Revocable Trust property. This use and enjoyment was continued until sometime around May of 2025 when Plaintiffs were having the grass on their property fertilized for hay production, as they have many times before. The fertilizer trucks and support vehicles were accessing the grass, as they always have, over the oilfield road on Defendant’s property when the Defendant contacted Plaintiff Clifton Wilson and protested that they were tearing up his road after the rain the previous night. 14. This was not an accurate assertion as the road was solid, as well as the field, as it was being fertilized at the same time. Defendant Tom Edwards contacted Plaintiff Clifton Wilson and protested the activity and threatened Plaintiff that he could lock one of the gates across the multiple cattle guards on the lease road and exclude him access to the road which Plaintiffs must have to access their property. This is the first time that Defendants had ever threatened to interfere with the use of Plaintiffs’ easement over Defendants’ property. 15. Later that year, on or about July 24, 2025, Plaintiffs noticed several cattle missing from their property. They continued to look for their cattle until after they had not had any success locating them or any sign of them, they contacted the Oklahoma Department of Agriculture to investigate in August of 2025. 16. The investigator recommended to the Plaintiffs that they lock the gate entering into their property from off of the oil lease road where the road made a Y into their property from the other part of the road that continued on into Defendant’s property. The gate was located on a cattle guard on the section line of Section Twenty-eight (28) and Section Twenty-nine (29) entering into Plaintiffs’ property. The oil lease road went into their property and terminated at the now non-producing well site of the “Corwin “A”” 5-28 within their property, terminating within their property. Locking the gate would not exclude anyone from anywhere that anyone had a right to be, as no one else had a purpose to be in their property and that branch of the road did not extend beyond their property. 17. This action, securing their property so that they would not lose anymore cattle, apparently infuriated Defendant Tom Edwards. Mr. Edwards placed locks on the gates accessing the lease road that Plaintiffs have used to access their property for over thirty (30) years. Mr. Edwards hung signs on the gate to the Plaintiff’s property that said “Jesus Said ‘Love Your Neighbor As Yourself’ Do not covet your neighbors (sic) property” and another that read “CLIFF Wilson You Are Trespassing KEEP Out!!! GO Back.” Ex. 10. 18. Locking the Plaintiffs out of the only access to their property has caused the Plaintiffs to lose the ability to graze the Northwest Quarter (NW/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28), as they cannot get to the well to check the water supply to cattle. They were unable to graze the property over the winter and have nearly lost all grazing on the 2026 winter grasses. 19. On Christmas afternoon, 2025, unsure of why Defendant Tom Edwards, after over thirty (30) years of a cordial neighborly relationship, had suddenly turned on them as he had, Plaintiffs called Mr. Edwards to try and resolve the issue, whatever it was. Defendant Tom Edwards explained, the best one could, to the Plaintiffs that they had accused him of stealing their cattle by locking their gate as they had. The Plaintiff’s explained to Mr. Edwards that they had been advised by the investigator to start locking the gates leading into their pasture because of the missing cattle. Mr. Edwards responded that they did not have permission to lock his gate (although curious given the gate and cattle guard that was locked was actually the division between Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ property, so, conceivably it was more Plaintiffs’ gate than Defendants’). Defendant Tom Edwards stated to Plaintiffs that they were good neighbors until Plaintiffs accused him. 20. The Plaintiffs attempted to explain to Mr. Edwards that they did not accuse him of stealing their cattle and that he was welcome on their property at any time. This fell on deaf ears and did not solve the issues. Plaintiffs remained locked off of their easement to their property by the Defendant. 21. Plaintiffs began exploring other options, discussing with county commissioners the possibility of opening the road beyond where it currently went and made arrangements for undersigned counsel to write Mr. Edwards and try and resolve the apparent dispute. Counsel did so and a copy of that letter is attached as Exhibit 11. Ex. 11. The letter was sent via certified mail and Defendant Rebecca Edwards received the letter on February 7, 2026. The letter again attempts to reasonably explain what Plaintiffs had tried to explain to Mr. Edwards themselves. 22. To date, both efforts have been unsuccessful to regain access to their property over their easement so that they may once again enjoy its use as they formerly had and has forced the Plaintiffs to commence this action. Their damages continue to grow as Plaintiffs are unable to use the property for haying or grazing without access to the property. Determining damages are nearly impossible as there is no way of knowing how much grazing or haying opportunity has been or will be lost, as it is so seasonal and depends on a variety of factors such as temperature and rainfall as to how much the forage grows or how nutritious it is. RELEVANT AUTHORITY FOR CAUSES OF ACTION I AND II Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations and statements and further alleges as follows: This matter can be decided almost completely under the published opinion of the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals in the case of Johnson v. Suttles. Johnson v. Suttles, 2009 OK CIV APP 89, 227 P.3d 664. Generally, all of the facts in that particular case which were favorable to the district court granting an easement, which the court of civil appeals affirmed, exist in the facts of this particular case. Ex. 12. Many of the facts in Johnson that the defendant used to unsuccessfully defend against the court finding easement are facts that are additionally present in this case before this Court that were not present in Johnson. In Johnson the Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s were in a dispute over an easement right of the Plaintiff’s to pass over the Defendant’s property to access the back portion of their property. As in the present case, in Johnson one portion of the Plaintiff’s property was accessible by public roadway, but the property was divided by a waterway that made passage from the accessible side to the other side impossible and their means to access the back part of their property was over an oilfield lease road that went across the Defendant’s property. Id. In Johnson, the Plaintiff’s used the inaccessible part of their property to grow hay which they raised and sold to livestock producers. To do so, they would have to take hay equipment down the lease road. In Johnson, the oilfield lease road was built after the defendants bought the property. Id. (emphasis added). In Johnson, the subject property was once a contiguous tract of property owned by a common owner. Neither the Plaintiff or Defendant in Johnson were the original owners of the separate tracts immediately proceeding the common properties division. In Johnson, the defendants were “absentee landowners” who moved back to Oklahoma while the Plaintiff leased the neighboring property and the plaintiff apparently used the road freely and without dispute. Id. Apparently, after about four (4) years of being residents of Oklahoma the land the Plaintiff rented came up for sale and the Plaintiff purchased the property. Id. The Johnson defendants had apparently been interest in buying the property the plaintiff had been renting and had purchased and shortly after plaintiff purchased the property the defendant began locking the gate to the oilfield road, denying the plaintiff access to that part of the property, apparently as a result of their displeasure.1 Id. 1 The Johnson defendant’s reasoning for suddenly locking the Plaintiff off of the defendant’s property indeed seems quite petty to the later reader of the Johnson case, but it is analogous to the matter here where the Defendant in the The trial court found the an easement by necessity existed over the oil lease road, regardless of the fact that the defendant argued that the plaintiff could create a low water crossing through the creek to access the back portion of their property and also argued that plaintiffs were not entitled to an easement because the lease road in that case did not exist when the property was divided. Id. at ¶ 23. In affirming the lower courts granting of an easement the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals discussed two theories of an easement in Johnson, ultimately finding that an easement by necessity indeed existed. The Johnson court recited the following elements of an easement by necessity: (1) unity of title; (2) conveyance of part of the land previously held under unity of title; and (3) a resulting necessity for access to the property at the time of severance. Id. at ¶ 9. The Johnson court noted that once granted the easement lasted for as long as the need for the easement existed. Id. The court discussed absolute or reasonable necessity concerning the required necessity in granting an easement by necessity. Id. at ¶ 17. In finding that only a reasonable necessity must exist, the court stated that, "[i]f the necessity of an easement is such that without it the land cannot be effectively used, nothing less than explicit language in the conveyance negating the creation of the easement will prevent its implication. The reasonable necessity rule is entirely consistent with Oklahoma's express policy of land utilization. We conclude that it applies in this State." Id. at ¶ 21. The Johnson court then goes on to state that "...in determining whether land "cannot be effectively used" without the granting of an easement by necessity, a trial court should examine present case convinced himself that the Plaintiff was accusing him of stealing his cattle because the Plaintiff began locking the gate to his own property at the advise of state agents who had investigated recent cattle thefts on the property with no intention of excluding the Defendant should he need to access the property, but instead was meant to exclude a likely cattle thief, which one would think that any reasonable neighboring landowner would also wish to promote and facilitate. such factors as the location and condition of the land, the cost of access, the financial resources of the applicant, and the burden such an easement will have upon the servient estate.” Id. The Johnson court also discussed the establishment of an easement by implication. The court stated that an easement by implication, or an implied easement or quasi-easement, “to establish an easement by implication there must first be a conveyance that divides one ownership into separately owned parts. At the time of conveyance one part of the property must be being used for the benefit of the other part, creating a quasi-easement.” Id. at ¶ 13. The Johnson court went on to state that an implied easement also “requires actual use of one part of the property for the benefit of the other (such as an access road) at the time of the conveyance separating the property into two tracts.” Id. at ¶ 14. CAUSES OF ACTION Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations and statements and further alleges as follows: CAUSE OF ACTION II: EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION- 23. As stated in Johnson, “to establish an easement by implication there must first be a conveyance that divides one ownership into separately owned parts. At the time of conveyance one part of the property must be being used for the benefit of the other part, creating a quasi-easement.” Id. “Generally, to show the existence of a common law easement by necessity, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) unity of title; (2) conveyance of part of the land previously held under unity of title; and (3) a resulting necessity for access to the property at the time of its severance. Johnson v. Suttles, 2009 OK CIV APP 90, ¶ 9, 227 P.3d 664, 667. 24. In the current case the Plaintiff’s have shown that the two (2) properties subject to this action, the Southeast Quarter (SE/4), the South Half of the Northeast Quarter (S/2 NE/4) and the Northwest Quarter (NW/4) of Section Twenty-Eight (28), Township Twenty-One (21) Range Fourteen (14) W.I.M in Major County, Oklahoma and the Northeast Quarter (NE/4) and the North Half of the Southeast Quarter (N/2 SE/4) of Section Twenty-Nine (29), Township Twenty-One (21), Range Fourteen (14) W.I.M. in Major County, Oklahoma were once commonly owned by the Walter L. Corwin Family Inter vivos Revocable Trust and that conveyances occurred as a result of a public auction held on May 23, 1992 which divided the commonly owned property into separately owned tracts. 25. The Plaintiffs have shown that the oil lease road, which is built around the Cheyenne Creek and the associated canyon as well as the other the rough and jagged terrain composing the Plaintiff’s property making passage and crossing impossible, which accesses the northern portion of Plaintiff’s property, through what is now the Defendant’s property, but was, at the time the road was built, a commonly owned parcel, existed at the time of the division of the common tract and the dividing conveyance and that it was being used to access that portion of Plaintiffs’ property, and has been used by Plaintiffs to access that portion of their property over greater than the last thirty (30) years. 26. Because of these facts the Plaintiff’s have established that, as the Johnson court stated, there was first a conveyance that divided one ownership into separately owned parts and at the time of conveyance one part of the property was being used for the benefit of the other part, creating a quasi-easement.” Id. CAUSE OF ACTION I PRAYER FOR RELIEF 27. WHERFORE, Plaintiff’s pray this Court 1) make a finding that an easement by implication exists; (2) grant an order reflecting the Court’s findings of the existence of an easement to be filed in the Major County Clerk’s Office, including a metes and bounds description of the easement conforming to the location of the current oil lease road as it exists today and as it existed at the time of its construction: (3) issue an order requiring the Defendant’s to sign a written agreement authorizing the oil company to leave the portion of the service road used by the Plaintiffs undisturbed upon abandonment of the oil well site(s) the road services, as was ordered in Johnson v. Suttles; (4) issue an order to Defendant’s permanently enjoining them from blocking access to the Plaintiff’s easement and their property from which they access through the easement (5) actual damages resulting from the Defendant’s exclusion of Plaintiff’s from their use and enjoyment of their property from Defendant’s malicious obstruction of Plaintiff’s easement; (6) attorney fees and costs; and (7) any other such relief that the Court finds equitable and just. CAUSE OF ACTION II: EASEMENT BY NECCESITY- 28. The Johnson court recited the following elements of an easement by necessity: (1) unity of title; (2) conveyance of part of the land previously held under unity of title; and (3) a resulting necessity for access to the property at the time of severance. 29. Plaintiffs have shown that the two (2) properties subject to this action, the Southeast Quarter (SE/4), the South Half of the Northeast Quarter (S/2 NE/4) and the Northwest Quarter (NW/4) East Half (E/2) of Section Twenty-Eight (28), Township Twenty-One (21) Range Fourteen (14) W.I.M in Major County, Oklahoma and the Northeast Quarter (NE/4) and the North Half of the Southeast Quarter (N/2 SE/4) of Section Twenty-Nine (29), Township Twenty-One (21), Range Fourteen (14) W.I.M. in Major County, Oklahoma, were once commonly owned by the Walter L. Corwin Family Inter Vivos Revocable Trust, were held in unity of title, and that conveyances occurred as a result of a public auction held on May 23, 1992 which divided the commonly owned property into separately owned tracts. 30. Plaintiffs have pled facts sufficient to show that the Cheyenne Creek divides their property, as well as rough and rugged terrain that make passage difficult with certain four wheel drive vehicles, and is impossible at most times with those vehicles, as well as showing that it is impossible to cross the creek with most equipment needed for the haying operation on the inaccessible portion of Plaintiffs’ property. 31. Because of this necessity Plaintiffs are entitled to an easement across Defendants’ property. CAUSE OF ACTION II PRAYER FOR RELIEF 32. WHERFORE, Plaintiff’s pray this Court (1) make a finding that an easement by necessity exists; (2) grant an order reflecting the Court’s findings of the existence of an easement to be filed in the Major County Clerk’s Office, including a metes and bounds description of the easement conforming to the location of the current oil lease road as it exists today and as it existed at the time of its construction: (3) issue an order requiring the Defendant’s to sign a written agreement authorizing the oil company to leave the portion of the service road used by the Plaintiffs undisturbed upon abandonment of the oil well site(s) the road services, as was ordered in Johnson v. Suttles; (4) issue an order to Defendant’s permanently enjoining them from blocking access to the Plaintiff’s easement and their property from which they access through the easement (5) actual damages resulting from the Defendant’s exclusion of Plaintiff’s from their use and enjoyment of their property from Defendant’s malicious obstruction of Plaintiff’s easement; (6) attorney fees and costs; and (7) any other such relief that the Court finds equitable and just. CAUSE OF ACTION III: INTERFERENCE WITH EASEMENT- 33. Oklahoma Courts have recognized an action for interference with an easement. In Barrett v. Humprey the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals stated, quoting 28 C.J.S. Easements § 243 and 250, "[t]he owner of an easement has a right of action for interference therewith against the owner of the servient estate," 28A C.J.S. Easements § 243, "[a]n easement owner may maintain an action at law for damages for interference with the easement by the owner of the servient estate..." Barrett v. Humphrey, 2012 OK CIV APP 28 ¶ 42, 275 P.3d 959. 34. Plaintiff’s have established that they have a valid easement over Defendant’s property. Defendant’s have willfully and maliciously obstructed Plaintiff’s right to use the easement by locking Plaintiff off of the easement. Under the authority in Barrett, Plaintiffs have a right to damages as they have established for loss of grazing of their property during the time that Defendants have interfered with their ability to get to their wells to pump water to stock tanks needed to graze their property as well as blocking access to check their cattle, as well as damages for any lost crop Plaintiff’s were unable to harvest because of Defendant’s malicious interference with their easement. CAUSE OF ACTION III PRAYER FOR RELIEF 35. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray this Court render a finding in favor of Plaintiff’s finding that Defendants have willfully interfered with Plaintiffs’ rights under the easement they possess over Defendants’ property as described in this Petition and award: (1) actual damages; (2) punitive damages; (3) issue an order to Defendant’s permanently enjoining them from blocking access to the Plaintiff’s easement and their property from which they access through the easement; (4) attorney fees and costs; and (5) any other such relief that this Court finds equitable and just. PRAYER WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, Clifton Dewane Wilson and Freda Unterkircher Wilson, as Trustees of the Clifton and Freda Wilson Revocable Trust, pray this honorable Court find according to the relief requested in the above causes of action and grant unto Plaintiffs any such other relief that this Court finds equitable and just. Dated this 7th day of April, 2026. Respectfully Submitted, [Signature] Stephen Jones, OBA #4805 William Jewell, OBA #34376 Blake Trekell, OBA #36282 JONES, OTJEN & JEWELL 214-A N. Independence St. Post Office Box 472 Enid, OK 73702 (580) 242-5500 (580) 242-4556 (fax) [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Attorneys for Plaintiffs VERIFICATION OF PLAINTIFFS STATE OF OKLAHOMA ) COUNTY OF MAJOR ) SS: I, the undersigned Clifton Dewane Wilson, as Trustee of the Clifton and Freda Wilson Revocable Trust, being first duly sworn upon my oath states as follows: I am Clifton Dewane Wilson, Trustee of the Clifton and Freda Wilson Revocable Trust. I have reviewed the above and foregoing Verified Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction and do verify and affirm that the contents thereof are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. Clifton D. Wilson Clifton Dewane Wilson, as Trustee of the Clifton and Freda Wilson Revocable Trust Subscribed and sworn to before me on this _6_ day of _april_, 2026. Notary Public State of Oklahoma Caitlyn Benge My Commission # 25007031 Expires 6/12/2029 Notary Public My Commission No. 25007031 My Commission Expires: 6/12/2029 STATE OF OKLAHOMA ) COUNTY OF MAJOR ) SS: I, the undersigned Freda Unterkircher Wilson, as Trustee of the Clifton and Freda Wilson Revocable Trust, being first duly sworn upon my oath states as follows: I am Freda Unterkircher Wilson. I have reviewed the above and foregoing Verified Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction and do verify and affirm that the contents thereof are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. Freda Unterkircher Wilson, as Trustee of the Clifton and Freda Wilson Revocable Trust Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 4 day of April, 2026. Notary Public (Seal) Notary Public State of Oklahoma Caitlyn Benge My Commission # 25007031 Expires 6/12/2029 My Commission No.: 25007031 My Commission Expires: 6/12/2029 THE WALTER L. CORWIN FAMILY INTER VIVOS REVOCABLE TRUST AGREEMENT ARTICLE I Transfer in Trust For good and valuable consideration, the Undersigned, Walter L. Corwin, and Dorothy Corwin, husband and wife of Brigham City, County of Box Elder, and State of Utah, hereby transfer and deliver to the Trustees and their successors the property listed in Schedule "A" or supplemental schedules annexed hereto and incorporated herein by reference, to have and to hold the same, and any cash, securities, or other property which the Trustees may, pursuant to any of the provisions hereof, at any time hereafter hold or acquire, all of such property being hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Trust Estate" for the uses and purposes and upon the terms and conditions herein set forth. ARTICLE II Disposition Before the Death of One of the Undersigned Before the death of one of the Undersigned, the Trustees shall hold, manage, invest, and re-invest the Trust Estate, and shall collect the income thereof and shall dispose of the net income and principal as follows: A. Subject to the provisions contained in Article XIII hereinafter, the Trustees shall pay to the Undersigned all of the net income of this Trust, in monthly or other convenient installments, but at least annually. The Trustees may, in their discretion, pay or apply for the benefit of the Undersigned, in addition to the income payments herein provided for, such amounts of the principal of the Trust Estate, up to the whole thereof, as the Trustees may from time to time deem necessary or advisable for the use and benefit of the Undersigned. ARTICLE III Disposition After Death of the First of the Undersigned to Die A. At the death of the First of the Undersigned, the Trustees shall divide the Trust Estate into two separate trusts, hereinafter designated as the Marital Trust and the Family Trust, respectively. In the event the Undersigned die under circumstances whereby it is difficult or impossible to determine who died first, then it shall be conclusively presumed that the wife had survived the husband. 8. The Marital Trust shall consist of the survivor of the Undersigned's interest in all community property in the Trust Estate, and such fractional interest in all other separate property of the first of the Undersigned to die that qualifies for the marital deduction under the federal estate tax law as necessary to reduce the federal estate taxes of the first of the Undersigned to die to the lowest possible amount, after considering and making allowances for all deductions and exemptions and the value of all other items which pass to or have passed to the survivor of the Undersigned under the provisions of this Trust, by operation of law or otherwise, but only to the extent that such items are includable in the gross estate of the first of the Undersigned to die and are allowable as a marital deduction for federal estate tax purposes; provided, however, notwithstanding any of the foregoing instructions, if the survivor shall die within six (6) months of the death of the first of the Undersigned to die, the Trustees shall transfer into the Marital Trust only so much of the estate of the first of the Undersigned to die as is necessary to minimize the total amount of combined federal estate taxes due as a result of the deaths of both of the Undersigned within said six-month period of time. In making computations to determine said fractional interest, the final determination for federal estate tax purposes shall control. In the sole power and discretion of the Trustees, the payment of said fractional interest may be made wholly or partly in cash or property, which is fairly representative of appreciation or depreciation of all property available to satisfy this provision, as selected by the Trustees; provided, however, that such property so selected to constitute said fractional interest shall be valued at the value thereof as finally determined for estate tax purposes in the estate of the first of the Undersigned to die; provided, also, in the event, and only in such event, that the distribution made under this paragraph is finally held or determined to be a pecuniary distribution rather than a fractional distribution, then in the event the assets distributed under this provision, as said fractional interest, are subsequently less in value at the time distributed than the value used for federal estate tax purposes, the Trustees shall implement the Marital Trust, and shall add thereto from the Family Trust qualified assets in an amount sufficient to bring said fractional interest in the Marital Trust up to the federal estate tax value, provided, further, that in no event shall there be included in the Marital Trust any of the separate assets of the first of the Undersigned to die, or the proceeds of said assets, which will not qualify for the marital deduction for federal estate tax purposes. C. The Marital Trust shall be held by the Trustees, separately in Trust, for the following purposes. 1. The Trustees shall pay as much of the income and principal to the survivor of the Undersigned as the survivor may request. 2. Upon the death of the survivor of the Undersigned, the Trustees shall dispose of the then-remaining principal and undistributed income of this Trust, if any, to such person or persons, including the estate of the survivor, as the survivor shall appoint. Such appointment shall be made by the survivor amending this Marital Trust, or by the survivor referring to and by affirmatively exercising this power of appointment in his or her Last Will and Testament. 3. Any principal and income of this Trust not effectively appointed by the survivor shall be added at the death of the survivor to the Family Trust and shall be held and administered as a part thereof; provided, however, that the Trustees may, in their discretion, first pay from the Marital Trust the last illness and funeral expenses and any death taxes of the survivor of the Undersigned. 4. If the survivor of the Undersigned disclaims part or all of the fractional interest in the Marital Trust as referred to in Article III, Paragraph B, the disclaimed property shall pass to, and become a part of, the Family Trust, and shall be distributed as set forth therein. D. The Family Trust shall contain the balance of the Trust Estate remaining after setting aside all property of the Trust Estate that is included in the Marital Trust, The Family Trust shall contain, also, any and all interest of the first of the Undersigned to die in any community property held by both of the Undersigned. The Family Trust shall be subject to the payment of all the death taxes of the first of the Undersigned to die, and shall be held by the Trustees separately in Trust for the following pur- 1. During the lifetime of the survivor of the Undersigned, the Trustees of the Family Trust shall distribute to said survivor such part or all of, first, the net income, and, second, the principal of the Family Trust as necessary or appropriate for the health, education, and maintenance of said survivor, and to provide for the support of said survivor in his or her accustomed manner of living, including reasonably adequate health, medical, dental, hospital, nursing, and invalidism expenses. Because the Undersigned intend that the properties of the Family Trust shall not be includable in the estate of the survivor of the Undersigned for estate tax purposes, the powers herein granted to the survivor of the Undersigned, while serving as a Trustee or Co-trustee of this Trust Agreement, shall be limited as follows: The survivor of the Undersigned shall have no right to determine the amount of any income or principal of the Family Trust to be retained or to be distributed to said survivor, or to distribute or manage such, but such determination, distribution, and management shall be made by the Trustee or Trustees serving with the survivor of the Undersigned. 2. Upon the death of the survivor of the Undersigned, the Trustees shall dispose of the then-remaining principal and income of the Family Trust as directed in Article IV. ARTICLE IV Disposition on Death of the Survivor of the Undersigned All trust principal, with all accumulated income thereof, directed to be disposed of under the provisions of Article IV, shall, upon the death of the survivor of the Undersigned, be held in Trust for the benefit of the children of the Undersigned, and shall be disposed of as follows: A. The Trustees shall first divide the Trust Estate into as many equal shares as there are children of the Undersigned then living, and children of the Undersigned then deceased but leaving surviving issue; provided, further, that each of said shares, if not immediately distributed, shall constitute and be held, administered, and distributed by the Trustees as a separate trust, as follows: 1. One such share shall be set aside for the benefit of each of the Undersigned's children who may then be living, and if held in trust, shall constitute the trust estate of such child's trust. 2. One such equal share of the Trust Estate shall be set aside for the benefit of the surviving issue, by right of representation, for each of the Undersigned's children who may then be deceased but leave issue surviving, and, if held in trust, shall constitute the trust estate of such issue's trust, provided, however, that prior to the creation of said trusts for said issue, that an amount determined by the Trustees, in their sole discretion, shall be set aside from the trust property passing to the issue of a deceased child of the Undersigned, and shall be used for the support and education of said issue who have not reached age 25 prior to the death of the survivor of the Undersigned. "Education" of the Undersigned's issue shall include, but not be limited to, musical education, dancing lessons, grammar school, secondary school, college, graduate school, trade school, and vocational training school. In determining the amount to be set aside from each issue's trust for education and support and the sums to be paid therefrom, the Trustees shall take into account the needs, ages, assets, and other available sources of income and support of said issue. The Trustees, in their sole discretion, may determine the amount to be distributed, the issue to whom distributions are to be made, and the time and manner of distributions made under this paragraph, and shall distribute according to the various needs of each issue, even if such distributions are apportioned unequally. After the youngest issue of a deceased child has attained age 25, the balance, if any, of the amounts set aside in trust for that deceased child's issue shall be distributed according to the distributive provisions in Article IV, Paragraph A., 3., below. 3. At the death of the survivor of the Undersigned, the share of the Trust Estates for each child shall be distributed to him, free and clear of trust, per stirpes, upon his request therefor. As each of the surviving issue of the children of the Undersigned attains age 25, his share of the Trust Estate, including an equal share of any amounts available for distribution from the trust created by Article IV, Paragraph A above, shall be distributed to him, free and clear of trust, per stirpes. B. Whenever used herein, the terms "issue", "child", "children", and "descendants" include adopted issue, adopted child, adopted children, and adopted descendants, as well as natural issue, natural child, natural children, and natural descendants, and include descendants of adopted issue, adopted child, adopted children, and adopted descendants. Provided, however, adopted issue who are also natural issue shall take their share of the Trust Estate only in one capacity, such capacity being the one which grants to such issue the larger share. Where applicable, the masculine includes the feminine, and vice versa; and the neuter includes the masculine or feminine, and vice versa. Where applicable, the singular includes the plural, and vice versa. C. If any of the above beneficiaries are unable or unwilling to take any portion of the Trust Estate, then the Trustees shall distribute the portion of the property of that beneficiary equally to the other living beneficiaries, or the survivor of them; and, if none, then as follows. one-half to the living heirs at law of the first of the Undersigned to die, and one-half to the living heirs at law of the last of the Undersigned to d.e., provided, further, that said heirs at law of each of the Undersigned shall take the trust property in the same priority and in the same distributive order as listed in the Utah law of intestate succession, as in force on the date of the signing of this Trust Agreement, provided, further, that if either of the Undersigned has no living heirs at law, then his or her one-half share shall pass to the living heirs at law of the other Undersigned. D. An amount equal to the maximum allowable statutory interest, if any, of the survivor of the Undersigned in his or her spouse's real property, shall be deemed received by the survivor by operation of law as such statutory interest, and only the excess, if any, over said amount shall be deemed received under the provisions of this Trust, and will be allocated by the Trustee to the appropriate Trust. ARTICLE V Spendthrift Provision After any of the trusts created herein become irrevocable, the interests of each beneficiary in income and principal shall be free from the control or interference of any creditor of such beneficiary, or the spouse of a married beneficiary, or the parent of a child beneficiary, and shall not be subject to attachment or be subject to assignment. ARTICLE VI Invalid Provisions If any of the provisions of this Trust are held to be invalid, none of the other provisions shall thereby be rendered invalid or inoperative as long as the remaining Trust Agreement does not frustrate the intents of the Undersigned, but tends to accomplish their over-all objectives. ARTICLE VII Perpetuities Savings Clause In any event, and anything to the contrary herein contained notwithstanding, the trusts created in this agreement shall terminate upon the day next preceding the expiration of twenty-one (21) years after the death of the Undersigned and their issue now living, in the event these trusts shall not have previously terminated in accordance with the terms hereof. In the event of termination of these trusts as provided for in this paragraph, the Trustee shall distribute the Trust Estate as it shall then be constituted, together with any net income, to the beneficiaries then entitled to the income from the Trust Estate in the same proportions in which they are entitled to such income. ARTICLE VIII Trustees A. The following people will act as Trustees in the following order of succession: First: The Undersigned, Walter L. Corwin, and Dorothy Corwin, together. Second: The survivor of the Undersigned, jointly, with Donald Jay Corwin, son of the Undersigned, as Co-trustees of the Marital Trust, or the survivor, and Donald Jay Corwin as Trustee of the Family Trust, Third: At the death of the survivor of the Undersigned, Donald Jay Corwin as sole Trustee. Fourth: A Trustee chosen by the majority of the beneficiaries with a parent or legal guardian voting for minor beneficiaries. B. Subject to the provisions of Article III, Paragraph D., Subparagraph 1., whenever more than two trustees are designated to act concurrently, a majority of the Trustees, whether individual or corporate, shall have the power to make any decision, undertake any action, or execute any documents affecting the trusts created herein. In the event of a difference of opinion among the Trustees, the decision of a majority of them shall prevail; but the dissenting or nonassenting Trustees shall not be responsible for any action taken by the majority pursuant to such decision. After the death of the first of the Undersigned to die, if only two individual Trustees are in office, they must act unanimously. If an individual and a corporate Trustee are in office, the determination of the individual Trustee shall be binding. C. Any Trustee may from time to time delegate to one or more of the remaining Trustees any powers, duties, or discretions. Every such delegation shall be made by a writing delivered to the delegate or delegates, and shall remain effective for the time therein specified or until earlier revocation by a writing similarly delivered. Every one dealing with the Trustees shall be absolutely protected in relying upon the certificate of any Trustee as to who are the Trustees for the time being acting, and as to the extent of their authority by reason of any delegation or otherwise. D. No Trustee named above need give bond in any jurisdiction. If a fiduciary's bond may not be dispensed with, the Under- signed request that the bond be accepted without surety and in the lowest possible amount. In the absence of breach of trust, no Trustee shall ever be required to qualify before, be appointed by, or account to any court, or obtain the order or approval of any court in the exercise of any power or discretion herein given. ARTICLE IX Powers of the Trustees A. The Trustees shall have full power to do everything in administering these trusts that they deem to be for the best interests of the beneficiaries (whether or not it be authorized or appropriate for fiduciaries but for this broad grant of authority), including power: 1. To acquire by purchase or otherwise, and to retain so long as they deem advisable, any kind of realty or personal property, or undivided interests therein, including common and preferred stocks, bonds, or other unsecured obligations, options, warrants, interests in investment trusts and discretionary common trust funds, all without diversification as to kind or amount, without being limited to investments authorized by law for the investment of trust funds, and power to hold or take title to property in the name of a nominee. 2. To sell for cash or on credit, at private or public sale, exchange, hypothecate, sell short, or otherwise dispose of any real or personal property. 3. To make distributions, including distributions to themselves as Trustees, in kind or in money or partly in each, even if shares be composed differently, for such purposes, the valuation of the Trustee shall be given effect if reasonably made. 4. If, in the Trustee's discretion, any beneficiary (whether a minor or of legal age) is incapable of making proper disposition of any sum of income or principal that is payable or appointed to said beneficiary under the terms of this Trust Agreement, the Trustee may apply said sum to or on behalf of the beneficiary by any one or more of the following methods: by payments on behalf of the beneficiary to anyone with whom the beneficiary resides, or by payments in discharge of the beneficiary's bills or debts, including bills for premiums on any insurance policies, or by paying an allowance to a beneficiary directly. The foregoing payments shall be made without regard to other resources of the beneficiary, or the duty of any person to support the beneficiary and without the intervention of any guardian or like fiduciary; provided, however, that the Trustee shall insure and see to the application of the funds for the benefit of the beneficiary, so that the funds will not be used by any adult person, or any other person for a purpose other than the direct benefit of the beneficiary, and particularly so that said funds will not be diverted from the purpose of support and education of said beneficiary. 5. To determine whether and to what extent receipts should be deemed income or principal, whether or to what extent expenditures should be charged against principal or income, and what other adjustments should be made between principal and income, provided such adjustments do not conflict with well-settled rules for the determination of principal and income questions. 6. To delegate powers to agents including accountants, investment counsel, appraisers, legal counsel, and other experts, remunerate them and pay their expenses, to employ custodians of the Trust assets, bookkeepers, clerks, and other assistants and pay them out of income or principal. 7. To renew, assign, alter, extend, compromise, release, with or without consideration, or submit to arbitration or litigation, obligations or claims held by or asserted against the Undersigned, the Trustees, or the Trust assets. 8. To borrow money, from others or from the Trustees for the payment of taxes, debts, or expenses, or for any other purpose which, in the opinion of the Trustees, will facilitate the administration of these trusts, and pledge or mortgage property as security for any such loans, and, if money is borrowed from any Trustee, individually, to pay interest thereon at the then prevailing rate of interest. 9. To lease, or grant options to lease, for periods to begin presently or in the future, without regard to statutory restrictions or the probable duration of any trust, to erect or alter buildings or otherwise improve and manage property, demolish buildings, make ordinary and extra-ordinary repairs, grant easements and charges, make partywall contracts, dedicate roads, subdivide, adjust boundary lines, partition and convey property or give money for equity or partition, to be either a general or limited partner. 10. To enter into transactions with any other trust in which the Undersigned or the beneficiaries of this Trust Agreement, or any of them, have beneficial interests, even though any Trustee of such other trust is also a Trustee under this Trust Agreement. 11. To exercise all the foregoing powers alone or in conjunction with others, even though any of the Trustees are personally interested in the property that is involved, notwithstanding any rules of law relating to divided loyalty or self-dealing. B, Any Trustee may decline to act or may resign as Trustee at any time by delivering a written resignation to the beneficiaries of a trust then subsisting. C, From the income of the trusts hereby created, or, if that be insufficient, from the principal thereof, the Trustees shall pay and discharge all expenses incurred in the administration of the trusts. D, No successor Trustee shall be liable for any misfeasance of any prior Trustee. ARTICLE X Additions to Trust A, It is understood that the Undersigned or any other person may grant, and the Trustees may receive, as part of this Trust, additional real and personal property, by assignment, transfer, deed, or other conveyance, or by any other means, testamentary or inter vivos, for inclusion in the Trust herein created, Any such property so received by the Trustee shall become a part of the Trust into which it is transferred and shall become subject to the terms of this Agreement. If such property is not specifically appointed to either the Marital Trust or the Family Trust in particular, it shall be divided equally between the two Trusts. B. It is specifically the intention of the Undersigned that all real and personal properties now owned by the Undersigned, except insurance policies, are to be a part of this Trust; provided, further, that all future real and personal properties acquired by the Undersigned are to be a part of or to automatically become a part of this Trust at the time acquired by the Undersigned. Provided, however, the Undersigned specifically intend and hereby direct that at no time shall there be allocated or transferred into this Trust any stock which the Undersigned may own in any Subchapter "S" corporation or corporation of similar nature under the then existing Internal Revenue Code. ARTICLE XI Delegation of Authority During physical or mental incapacitation, each of the Undersigned herein appoints the other Trustee or Trustees to succeed to his or her place either as Trustee, Guardian, Executor, or in any other legal capacity, whether appointed orally or in writing, and to supervise all matters in which either of the Undersigned had the right to act if he or she had not become incapacitated. ARTICLE XII Parties Dealing with Trustees No purchaser, and no issuer of any stock, bond, or other instrument evidencing a deposit of money or property, or other person dealing with the Trustee hereunder with respect to any property hereunder as purchaser, lessee, party to a contract or lease, or in any other capacity whatsoever, shall be under any obligation whatsoever to see to the disbursing of money paid to the Trustee or to the due execution of this Trust, in any particular, but such persons shall be absolutely free in dealing with the Trustee on the same basis as though the Trustee was the absolute owner of the said property, with- -11- out any conditions, restrictions, or qualifications whatsoever. ARTICLE XIII Separate Property to Remain Separate Property All property now or hereafter conveyed or transferred to the Trustees to be held by the Trustees pursuant to this Trust Agreement that was community property or separate property at the time of such conveyance or transfer shall remain, respectively, the community property or the separate property of the Undersigned transferring such property to the Trustees. Accordingly, while both of the Undersigned are alive, the Trustees shall pay to each of the Undersigned only the income or principal from his or her separate trust property that he or she has contributed to this Trust. ARTICLE XIV Revocation and Amendment A. As long as both of the Undersigned are alive, each of them reserves the right, without the consent or approval of the other, to amend, modify, revoke, or remove from this Trust the property that each has contributed, in whole or in part, including the principal, and the present or past undisbursed income from such principal. After the first of the Undersigned has died, the survivor may amend or revoke only the Marital Trust, while the Family Trust shall continue as an irrevocable trust and will be administered and distributed as set forth herein. On the death of the survivor of the Undersigned, the remainder of the Trust Estate, and the trusts created hereinafter, may not be amended, revoked, or terminated, other than by disposition of the trust property to the beneficiaries according to the terms stated herein. B. While both of the Undersigned are alive, they shall have full authority, in their discretion, to sell, convey, or mortgage property in their own names, without disclosing their capacity as Trustees of this Trust Agreement; any such sale or conveyance of property shall be considered, and shall cause, a partial revocation of the Trust with respect to the property so conveyed or sold. ARTICLE XV Vested Interest of Beneficiaries The interest of the beneficiaries is a present vested in- terest which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death. As long as this Trust subsists, the Trust properties and all rights and privileges thereunder shall be controlled and exercised by the Trustees named herein. ARTICLE XVI Governing Law This Agreement shall be construed and regulated by the laws of the State of Utah. ARTICLE XVII Common Disaster In the event the Undersigned shall die under circumstances in which it is difficult or impossible to ascertain who died first, for the purpose of this Trust Agreement, it shall be conclusively presumed that the wife had survived the husband. ARTICLE XVIII If either of the Undersigned has a serious illness or operation, the Undersigned request that the Trustees call their attorney, Michael R. Loveridge, to obtain instructions in case either of the Undersigned should die. If death makes this prior conversation impossible, then the Trustee should call said attorney as soon as possible thereafter. If Michael R. Loveridge is deceased, then the Trustee should contact the Utah State Bar Association to obtain names of attorneys specializing in estate planning and select one for services required. ARTICLE XIX This Trust Agreement has been prepared in duplicate, each copy of which has been executed as an original. One of these executed copies is in the possession of the Undersigned, and the other is deposited for safekeeping with the Undersigned's attorney, Michael R. Loveridge. Either copy may be used as an original without the other; and, if only one copy of this Trust Agreement can be found, then it shall be considered as the original, and the missing copy will be presumed inadvertently lost. Any clarifications or instructions concerning this Trust Agreement may be obtained by calling the above-mentioned attorney, who is requested to do everything necessary to implement the provisions of this Trust. ARTICLE XX The Undersigned, Walter Lee Corwin, has signed his name and/or is known by his whole name or by a portion thereof only, or by a certain combination of names and/or the initials thereof. The Undersigned, Dorothy Mae Niehusen, has signed her name and/or is known by her whole name or by a portion thereof only or by certain combinations of names and/or initials thereof, and also by the name of Mrs. Walter Lee Corwin, and/or a portion only of said name or the initials thereof. Regardless of what combinations of the names and signatures of the Undersigned appear on past, present, or future written documents, the names and signatures of the Undersigned, as written below, are intended by the Undersigned, and shall be effective to transfer and convey the property listed in said written documents into this Trust. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Undersigned have executed this Trust Agreement on the 8th day of August, 1975. WALTER L. CORWIN DOROTHY M. CORWIN STATE OF UTAH ) COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ss. On this 8th day of August, 1974, personally appeared before me WALTER L. CORWIN and DOROTHY M. CORWIN, who acknowledged to me that they executed the foregoing Trust Agreement. My Commission Expires: 8-21-77 Notary Public Residing: Salt Lake City, Utah SCHEDULE "A" For Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable consideration, the Undersigned, as Grantors, hereby transfer, convey, assign, and deliver to the Trustees, as Grantees, the below-listed property with all right, title, interest, and obligations pertaining thereto, subject to the terms and conditions of the Walter L. Corwin Family Inter Vivos Revocable Trust Agreement dated the 8th day of August, 1975, and signed by the Undersigned, as Grantors. 1. All present and future interest of the Undersigned in the following real estate, including any and all contractual rights or obligations pertaining thereto, together with all present and future improvements thereon, and all present and future water and water rights thereunto belonging and also including all present and all future personal property located thereon: A. Tract of land in Box Elder County, State of Utah: Lot 1, Block 6, Skyline Terrace, Plat II, Brigham City, Utah. B. Real property in Major County, State of Oklahoma; Parcels 1 through 6 described below: 1. The East 1/2 and the Northwest 1/4 of Section Twenty-eight (28), Township Twenty-one (21) North, Range Fourteen (14), W.I.M., Major County, Oklahoma, 480 acres, 2. The North 1/2 of the Northwest 1/4 of Section Twenty-seven (27), Township Twenty-one (21) North, Range Fourteen (14), W.I.M., Major County, Oklahoma, 80 acres, 3. The South 1/2 of the Southwest 1/4 of Section Twenty-one (21), Township Twenty-one (21) North, Range Fourteen (14), W.I.M., Major County, Oklahoma, 80 acres, 4. The South 1/2 of the Southeast 1/4 of Section Twenty (20), Township Twenty-one (21) North, Range Fourteen (14), W.I.M., Major County, Oklahoma, 80 acres, 5. The Northeast 1/4 and the North 1/2 of the Southeast 1/4 of Section Twenty-nine (29), Township Twenty-one (21) North, Range Fourteen (14), W.I.M., Major County, Oklahoma, 240 acres, 6. Lots One (1) and Two (2) in Block Twenty-two (22), Park Place Addition to the City of Fairview, Major County, Oklahoma, 2. The following accounts in the following institutions, together with all future additions, interest, or accumulations therein, and also including all new accounts and the accumulations and the future additions, interest, or accumulations in any and all other financial institutions in which new accounts are opened in the future. 2 A. Box Elder County Bank Brigham City, Utah Checking Account No. 7 020683 9 B. Ogden First Federal Savings and Loan Association Brigham City, Utah Savings Account No 7818-6 C. Thiokol Employees Credit Union 518 N Main, Brigham City, Utah 84302 Account No 20007 3. The following securities in the following companies, together with all future accumulations and purchases in said companies, together with all future securities and accumulations purchased in any and all other companies A. Bunker Ramo Corporation Certificate No. M0009374; 17 Shares Dated May 16, 1973 B. Cap Corp Certificate No OL 3531, 9 Shares Dated April 4, 1975 C. Phillips Petroleum Company Certificate No O 626392, 5 Shares Dated February 26, 1951 Certificate No F 46100, 5 Shares Dated July 21, 1951 Certificate No. F 393214, 10 Shares Dated June 19, 1956 Certificate No. F 871467, 2 Shares Dated February 15, 1967 Certificate No A0123080, 22 Shares Dated May 12, 1969 D. Sperry Rand Corporation Certificate No NO464279, 20 Shares Dated November 9, 1970 E. Transamerica Corporation Certificate No SF/H 1324694; 1 Share Dated June 5, 1970 Certificate No NY/E 485870, 10 Shares Dated October 24, 1968 Certificate No. SF/H 1403047, 1 Share Dated September 4, 1972 Certificate No SF/H 857472, 10 Shares Dated February 5, 1969 F. Western Tungsten Mining Corporation Certificate No 103, 6,000 Shares Dated January 9, 1969 G IDS New Dimensions Fund, Acct. No. 0306-1767,054-9 H. IDS Investors Accumulation Plan, Acct. No.0102-1767,054-5 I. Providor Growth Fund c/o Fund/Plan Services, Inc., Philadelphia, PA Account No. 00000040212 4. Owned Vehicles. A. 1963 Volks 4, Convert Serial No. 5393791 Utah Certificate of Title No. 158261 B. 1967 Ford 8, 4-Dr., GLX 500 Serial No 7P56H 119835 Utah Certificate of Title No. 446065 4. Limited Partnership Agreement, dated July 27, 1974, between Canadian-American Resources Fund, Inc., signed by Jack C. Fikes, President, and Quasar Petroleum Ltd., signed by Albert J Cohen, Secretary-Treasurer, and Limited Partners, Walter L. Corwin, and Dorothy M. Corwin. Walter L. Corwin Dorothy M. Corwin STATE OF UTAH ) COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ss. On this 8th day of August, 1975, personally appeared before me WALTER L. CORWIN, and DOROTHY M. CORWIN, who acknowledged to me that they executed the foregoing Schedule "A". My Commission Expires: August 21, 1977 Michael R. Lowndes Notary Public Residing Salt Lake City, Utah BOOK 731 PAGE 176 COMPLETE REPORT OKLAHOMA CORPORATION COMMISSION OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION DIVISION 101 Theater Building Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73105-4933 COMPLETION & TEST DATA BY PRODUCING FORMATION FORM 1869r Rev. 1992 50914010 JGQ INOL 1 251(V)S3G03 COUNTY: Major SEC 28 TWP 21N RGE 14N LEASE NAME: Corwin "A" WELL NO: 5-28 SRC.CNW/H/4 1/4 1/4 1320' FSL 1320' FIL OF IA SEC BUL.CNW/H/4 1/4 1/4 1320' FSL 1320' FIL OF IA SEC ELEVATION. Derrick Fl Ground 1630' SAID DATE 03-16-84 ORIGINAL FINISHED 04-04-84 WELL COMPLETION 05-12-84 1ST PROD DATE 07-21-95 RECORD DATE 08-04-95 OPERATOR NAME Cross Timbers Operating Co. OIT/CDEC OPER NJ 18262 ADDRESS 210 Park Ave., Suite 2350 CITY Oklahoma City STATE OK. ZIP 73102 COMPLETION TYPE OIL OR GAS ZONES <table> <tr> <th>FORMATION</th> <th>OIL</th> <th>GAS</th> </tr> <tr> <td>Inola</td> <td>7384</td> <td>7395</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Chester</td> <td>7494</td> <td>7879</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Mississippi Solid</td> <td>8236</td> <td>8927</td> </tr> </table> LOCATION EXCEPTION ORDER NO INCREASED DENSITY ORDER NO FENLIV 80 Acre Oil Allow. Casing & Cement [Forms 1032C must be attached] <table> <tr> <th>TYPE</th> <th>SIZE</th> <th>WEIGHT</th> <th>GRADE</th> <th>FEEJ</th> <th>PSI</th> <th>PSI</th> <th>SURF</th> <th>FILLUP</th> <th>TOP</th> </tr> <tr> <td>Conductor</td> <td>20"</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>60'</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Surface</td> <td>8 5/8" 24#</td> <td>J-55</td> <td></td> <td>1200</td> <td>550</td> <td>1000'</td> <td>Surf</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Intermediate</td> <td>4 1/2" 11.6K-55</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>9095'</td> <td>2500</td> <td>450</td> <td>1865'</td> <td>7230'</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Production</td> <td>10.5K-55</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Other</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table> MISSISSIPPI SOLID FIRING SPACING & SPACING 255078 ORDER NUMBER 640 acres CLASSIFICATION Recomplete as Oil, Gas, Drft, Inj Connangled Oil Well PERFORATED INTERVALS 7386-7392 7534-7544 8366-8890 ACID/VOLUME Dual Acid Treatment Inola & Chester, 6000 gals 20% SXC Fracture Treated? No Fluids Amounts Yes 8038 bbls INITIAL TEST DATA Initial Test Date 08-04-95 0.1-bbl/day 10 0.1-gravity bbl/pd Gas-MCF/day 90 Gas-Oil Ratio Cu Ft/bbl 38.2 Water-bbl/day 9000 SEP 07 1995 8000 Pumping oil & Flooding 32 Pumping oil & Gas Conservation Pumping Initial Shut-In Pressure 700 psi 900 psi 100 psi CERE SIZE FLOW TUBING PRESSURE A record of the formations drilled through and pertinent remarks are presented on the reverse. I declare that I have knowledge of the contents of this report and am authorized by my organization to make this report which was prepared by me under its supervision and direction, with the data and facts stated herein to be true, correct and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief. Signature ____________________________ Bruce E. Hankins, Eng. Tech. 210 Park Ave., Suite 2350 Oklahoman City, OK 73102 251(V)S3G03 EXHIBIT CITY 210 Park Ave., Suite 2350 Oklahoma City, OK 73102 STATE OK ZIP PBTID: 9045' DATE 09-05-95 PHONE NUMBER (405) 232-4011 Major County, Oklahoma 28-T21N-R14W 2023 Program Year Map Created July 20, 2022 Farm 5110 Not to Scale Wetlands Wetland Determination Identifiers ○ Restricted Use ▼ Limited Restrictions ■ Exempt United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Farm Service Agency (FSA) maps are for FSA Program administration only. This map does not represent ownership; rather it depicts the information provided directly from the producer and/or National Agricultural Imagery Program (NAIP) imagery. The USDA assumes all risks associated with its use. USDA-FSA assumes no responsibility for actual or consequential damage incurred as a result of any use of this map or Programs. Wetland identifiers do not represent the size, shape, or specific determination of the area. Refer to your original determination (CPA-04) boundaries and determinations or contact USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS). RECORD AND HOLD IN COUNTY FILES EASEMENT NO. 1 EASEMENT for Public Highway KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That John A. Edwards and Leola Edwards, Husband & Wife, of Major County, State of Oklahoma, hereinafter called the Grantors (whether one or more), for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar and other good, valuable and sufficient considerations, do hereby grant, bargain, sell, convey and dedicate unto the County of Major the following described lot or parcels of land for the purpose of establishing thereon a public highway or facilities necessary and incidental thereto, to-wit: A strip, piece or parcel of land lying in the SW 1/4 of Section 28, T21N, R14W, J.M., Major County, Oklahoma, being more particularly described as follows: The West 33.00 feet of the SW 1/4 SW 1/4 of said Section 28. Containing 1.00 acre, more or less, of now right-of-way. State of Oklahoma, Major County ss This Instrument was filed for record JUN 24 1992 A.D. office stamp is only recorded in Book 1274 W MISC on Page 196 By [signature] Deputy [stamp] For the same considerations hereinbefore recited, said Grantors hereby waive, relinquish and release any and all right, title or interest in and to the surface of the above granted and dedicated tract of land and the appurtenances thereunto belonging, including any and all dirt, rock, gravel, sand and other road building materials, reserving and excepting unto said Grantors the mineral rights therein provided, however, that any explorations or development of said reserved mineral rights shall not directly or indirectly interfere with the use of said land for the purposes herein granted; and reserving unto said Grantors the right of ingress and egress to said public highway from the remaining lands of the Grantors. To have and to hold said above described premises unto the said County of Major free, clear and discharged from any and all claims of damages or injury that may be sustained directly or indirectly to the remaining lands of the Grantors by reason of the construction and maintenance of a public highway and all highway excavations, embankments, structures, bridges, drains, sight distance of safety areas and other facilities that may now or hereafter be, in the discretion of the grantees, necessary for the construction and maintenance of a public highway and incidental facilities over, across or along the above described real estate; the supervision and control of said public highway to be in such municipality, county or other agency of the State of Oklahoma as has or may have jurisdiction thereof by the laws of the State of Oklahoma; and said County of Major, Its officers, agents, contractors and employees are hereby granted free access to said property for the purpose of entering upon, constructing, maintaining or regulating the use of said public highway and incidental facilities. Said Grantors hereby covenant and warrant that at the time of delivery of these presents they are the owners in fee simple of the above described premises and that same are free and clear of all liens and claims whatsoever, except None. The undersigned Grantors hereby designate and appoint None as agent to execute the claim and receive the compensation herein named. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantors herein named have hereunto set their hands and seals this the 9th day of June, 1992. John H. Edwards Leola Edwards BRAWLEY ENGINEERING CORP 4658495579 P.02 RECORD AND HOLD IN COUNTY FILES EASEMENT NO. 2 EASEMENT for Public Highway KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That Dale A. Edwards and Wanda Jane Nipper Trustees of Major County, State of Oklahoma, hereinafter called the Grantors (whether one or more), for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar. (1.00) and other good, valuable and sufficient considerations, do hereby grant, bargain, sell, convey and dedicate unto the County of Major the following described lots or parcels of land for the purpose of establishing thereon a public highway or facilities necessary and incidental thereto, to-wit: A strip, piece or parcel of land lying in the SE 1/4 of Section 29, T21N, R14W, I.M., Major County, Oklahoma, being more particularly described as follows: The East 33.00 feet of the SE 1/4 SE 1/4 of said Section 29. Containing 1.00 acre, more or less, of new right-of-way. State of Oklahoma, Major County This Instrument was filed for record JUN 24 1992 A.D. at 1:30p'stuck A.M & duly recorded In Book 1274 of MISC. on Page 198 BY JANIE GRAVINS County Clerk Deputy For the same considerations hereinbefore recited, said Grantors hereby waive, relinquish and release any and all right, title or interest in and to the surface of the above granted and dedicated tract of land and the appurtenances thereto belonging, including any and all dirt, rock, gravel, sand and other road building materials, reserving and excepting unto said Grantors the mineral rights therein provided, however, that any explorations or development of said reserved mineral rights shall not directly or indirectly interfere with the use of said land for the purposes herein granted; and reserving unto said Grantors the right of ingress and egress to said public highway from the remaining lands of the Grantors. To have and to hold said above described premises unto the said County of Major free, clear and discharged from any and all claims of damages or injury that may be sustained directly or indirectly to the remaining lands of the Grantors by reason of the construction and maintenance of a public highway and all highway excavations, embankments, structures, bridges, drawns, sight distance of safety areas and other facilities that may now or hereafter be, in the discretion of the grantee, necessary for the construction and maintenance of a public highway and incidental facilities over, across or along the above described real estate; the supervision and control of said public highway to be in such municipality, county or other agency of the State of Oklahoma as has or may have jurisdiction thereof by the laws of the State of Oklahoma; and said County of Major its officers, agents, contractors and employees are hereby granted free access to said property for the purpose of entering upon, constructing, maintaining or regulating the use of said public highway and incidental facilities. Said Grantors hereby covenant and warrant that at the time of delivery of these presents they are the owners in fee simple of the above described premises and that same are free and clear of all liens and claims whatsoever, except none. The undersigned Grantors hereby designate and appoint none as agent to execute the claim and receive the compensation herein named. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantors herein named have hereunto set their hands and seals this the 12th day of June 1992. Dale A. Edwards Trustee Wanda Jane Nipper Trustee CORWIN RANCH 960 ACRES 117.2 ACRES CULTIVATION Cimarron AUCTIONEERS MAJOR COUNTY FAIRVIEW, CHESTER AREA AUCTION SATURDAY, MAY 23, 1992 10:00 A.M. SALE LOCATION: Intersection of Highways 58 & 60. South edge of Fairview, go 3 miles West on highway 60, take rock road 9 1/2 miles West. Watch for auction signs. FROM CHESTER: 10 Miles East on Highway 60, 3 miles North, 2 1/4 miles East to auction site. TRACT #1: S 1/2 SE 1/4 of Section 20-T21-R14 W.I.M. 80 acres (MOL). All grass TRACT #2: SW 1/2 of Section 21-T21-R14 W.I.M. 80 Acres (MOL). All grass TRACT #3: N 1/2 NW 1/4 of Section 27-T21-R14 W.I.M. 80 acres (MOL). 19.6 acres in cultivation, balance grass. TRACT #4: E 1/2 & NW 1/4 of Section 28-T21-R14 W.I.M. .480 acres (MOL). 70.7 acres in cultivation, balance grass. TRACT #5: NE 1/4 & N 1/2 SE 1/4 of Section 29-T21-R14 W.I.M. 240 acres (MOL). 26.4 acres in cultivation, balance grass. MINERALS: NO OIL or GAS minerals will sell. SALE ORDER: Tract #1, Tract #2, Tract #3, Tract #4 and Tract #5. Each tract will be offered separately first, then any combination, then all together as one unit, whichever way brings the most money. Auction will be held on Tract #4. AUCTIONEER'S NOTE: Rural water is available along south section lines 27, 28, 29, with a pasture tap in the SE 1/4 of Section 28. There are ponds throughout the property and a creek runs across the property. All information pertaining to the property is taken from sources believed to be reliable. However, no guarantee is made by the auction company or its employer. Buyers should satisfy themselves to the crop bases, acreages, crop yields and condition before the auction. There is an abundance of wildlife in the area. The property has a 4 & 5 barb wire as a perimeter fence. Cultivated ground is fenced separately. Contact the auction company for more details and inspection. TERMS: 10% Down day of auction placed in escrow. Balance due at closing. TITLE: Will be conveyed by a good and merchantable title. TAXES: Pro-rated to day of closing. POSSESSION: August 1, 1992. SELLER'S: Walter Corwin, Mary Corwin Fellows, Mrs. Robert E. (Janet Corwin) Taylor ANNOUNCEMENTS MADE DAY OF SALE SUPERSEDE ALL ADVERTISING. Another Auction By: CIMARRON AUCTIONEERS 102 South Van Buren Enid, Oklahoma 73703 John Keith-Broker Otis Munkres-Broker Associate (405)242-3211 233-3510 758-4578 Kenneth Ensminger-Broker Associate Larry DeHaas-Sales Associate Auctioneer 242-6128 822-3659 EXHIBIT 6 JOINT TENANCY WARRANTY DEED KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: THAT MARY HELEN FELLOWS, a/k/a MARY HELEN GRIFFIN, a widow, WALTER L. CORWIN and DOROTHY M. CORWIN, Co-Trustees of the Walter L. Corwin Family Inter Vivos Trust Agreement, dated August 8, 1975, and ROBERT E. TAYLOR and JANET A. TAYLOR, a/k/a JANET ANN TAYLOR, Trustees under the Revocable Living Trust, known as the TAYLOR Family Trust, dated November 8, 1991; parties of the first part, in consideration of the sum of TEN AND OTHER DOLLARS, in hand paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, does hereby Grant, Bargain, Sell, and Convey unto THOMAS W. EDWARDS and REBECCA M. EDWARDS, husband and wife, as joint tenants and not as tenants in common with full rights of survivorship, the whole estate to vest in the survivor in the event of the death of either, of Major County, State of Oklahoma, parties of the second part, the following described real property and premises situate in Major County, State of Oklahoma, to-wit: SURFACE ONLY OF: The South Half of the Southeast Quarter (S/2 SE/4) of Section Twenty (20), Township Twenty-one (21) North, Range Fourteen (14), W.I.M., Major County, Oklahoma AND The South Half of the Southwest Quarter (S/2 SW/4) of Section Twenty-one (21), Township Twenty-one (21) North, Range Fourteen (14), W.I.M., Major County, Oklahoma AND The North Half of the Southeast Quarter (N/2 SE/4) and the Northeast Quarter (NE/4) of Section Twenty-nine (29), Township Twenty-one (21) North, Range Fourteen (14), W.I.M., Major County, Oklahoma together with all the improvements thereon and the appurtenances thereunto belonging, and warrant the title to the same. TO HAVE AND TO HOLD said described premises unto the said parties of the second part, as joint tenants, and to the heirs, and assigns of the survivor, forever, free, clear and discharged of and from all former grants, charges, taxes, judgments, mortgages and other liens and incumbrances of whatsoever nature. Signed and delivered this 10TH day of July, 1992. Warranty Deed Page 2 Walter L Corwin WALTER L. CORWIN, Co-Trustee Walter L. Corwin Family Inter Vivos Trust Agreement, dated August 8, 1975 Robert E Taylor ROBERT E. TAYLOR, Trustee of Taylor Family Trust, dated November 8, 1991 Mary Helen Fellows MARY HELEN FELLOWS, a/k/a MARY HELEN GRIFFIN Dorothy M Corwin DOROTHY M. CORWIN, Co-Trustee Walter L. Corwin Family Inter Vivos Trust Agreement, dated August 8, 1975 Janet A Taylor JANET A. TAYLOR, a/k/a JANET ANN TAYLOR, Trustee of Taylor Family Trust, dated November 8, 1991 STATE OF OKLAHOMA ) COUNTY OF KIOWA ) Before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public, in and for said County and State, on this 13th day of July, 1992, personally appeared MARY HELEN FELLOWS, a/k/a MARY HELEN GRIFFIN, a widow, to me known to be the identical person who executed the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that she, executed the same as her free and voluntary act and deed for the uses and purposes therein expressed. Given under my hand and seal the day and year last above written. John D Metzger Notary Public My Commission Expires: 6/18/1995 STATE OF OKLAHOMA ) COUNTY OF KIOWA ) Before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public, in and for said County and State, on this 13th day of July, 1992, personally appeared WALTER L. CORWIN and DOROTHY M. CORWIN, Co-Trustees of the Walter L. Corwin Family Inter Vivos Trust Agreement, dated August 8, 1975, to me known to be the identical persons who executed the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that they executed the same as their free and voluntary act and deed for the uses and purposes therein set forth. Given under my hand and seal the day and year last above written. NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF Oklahoma ) COUNTY OF Tulsa ) SS: Before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public, in and for said County and State, on this 10th day of July, 1992, personally appeared ROBERT E. TAYLOR and JANET A. TAYLOR, a/k/a JANET ANN TAYLOR, Trustees under the Revocable Living Trust, known as the TAYLOR Family Trust, dated November 8, 1991, to me known to be the identical persons who executed the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that they executed the same as their free and voluntary act and deed for the uses and purposes therein expressed. Given under my hand and seal the day and year last above written. [signature] Notary Public My Commission Expires: 10-16-95 WARRANTY DEED KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That ROBERT E. TAYLOR and JANET A. TAYLOR, a/k/a JANET ANN TAYLOR, Trustees under the Revocable Living Trust, known as the Taylor Family Trust, dated November 8, 1991; WALTER L. CORWIN and DOROTHY M. CORWIN, Co-Trustees of the Walter L. Corwin Family Inter Vivos Trust Agreement, dated August 8, 1975, MARY HELEN FELLOWS, a/k/a MARY HELEN GRIFFIN, a widow, parties of the first part, in consideration of the sum of TEN AND OTHER DOLLARS, in hand paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do hereby Grant, Bargain, Sell, and Convey unto CLIFTON D. WILSON, of Major County, State of Oklahoma, party of the second part, the following described real property and premises situate in Major County, State of Oklahoma, to-wit: THE SURFACE ONLY OF: The Northwest Quarter (NW/4) and the Southeast Quarter (SE/4) and the South Half of the Northeast Quarter (S/2 NE/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28), Township Twenty-one (21) North, Range Fourteen (14), W.I.M., Major County, Oklahoma, together with all the improvements thereon and the appurtenances thereunto belonging, and warrant the title to the same. TO HAVE AND TO HOLD said described premises unto the said parties of the second part, their heirs and assigns forever, free, clear, and discharged of and from all former grants, charges, taxes, judgments, mortgages and other liens and incumbrances of whatsoever nature. Signed and delivered this 10TH day of July, 1992. ROBERT E. TAYLOR, Co-Trustee under the Revocable Living Trust, known as the Taylor Family Trust, dated November 8, 1991 JANET A. TAYLOR, a/k/a JANET ANN TAYLOR, Co-Trustee under the Revocable Living Trust, known as the Taylor Family Trust, dated November 8, 1991 WALTER L. CORWIN, Co-Trustee of the Walter L. Corwin Family Inter Vivos Trust Agreement, dated August 8, 1975 Warranty Deed Page 2 DOROTHY M. CORWIN, Co-Trustee of the Walter L. Corwin Family Inter Vivos Trust Agreement, dated August 8, 1975 MARY HELEN FELLOWS, a/k/a MARY HELEN GRIFFIN STATE OF OKLAHOMA ) COUNTY OF Tulsa ) SS: Before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public, in and for said County and State, on this 10th day of July, 1992, personally appeared ROBERT E. TAYLOR and JANET A. TAYLOR, a/k/a JANET ANN TAYLOR, Trustees under the Revocable Living Trust, known as The Taylor Family Trust, dated November 8, 1991, to me known to be the identical persons who executed the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that they executed the same as their free and voluntary act and deed for the uses and purposes therein set forth. Given under my hand and seal the day and year last above written. NOTARY PUBLIC MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 10-16-95 STATE OF OKLAHOMA ) COUNTY OF Tulsa ) SS: Before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public, in and for said County and State, on this 11th day of July, 1992, personally appeared WALTER L. CORWIN and DOROTHY M. CORWIN, Co-Trusters of the Walter L. Corwin Family Inter Vivos Trust Agreement, dated August 8, 1975, to me known to be the identical persons who executed the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that they executed the same as their free and voluntary act and deed for the uses and purposes therein set forth. Given under my hand and seal the day and year last above written. NOTARY PUBLIC MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 9/14/92 STATE OF OKLAHOMA ) SS: COUNTY OF Kiowa ) Before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public, in and for said County and State, on this 13th day of July, 1992, personally appeared MARY HELEN FELLOWS, a/k/a MARY HELEN GRIFFIN, to me known to be the identical person who executed the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that she executed the same as her free and voluntary act and deed for the uses and purposes therein set forth. Given under my hand and seal the day and year last above written. NOTARY PUBLIC MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: Feb. 13, 1995 QUIT-CLAIM DEED THIS INDENTURE, made this 20 day of Nov., 2018, between Clifton Dewane Wilson and Freda Unterkircher Wilson, husband and wife, of 1013 South 14th Ave., Fairview, Oklahoma, 73737, grantors and parties of the first part, and Clifton Dewane Wilson and Freda Unterkircher Wilson, Trustees of The Clifton and Freda Wilson Revocable Trust dated November 20, 2018, grantees and parties of the second part. WITNESSETH, that grantors and parties of the first part, in consideration of the sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable consideration, duly paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do hereby quit-claim, grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the grantees and parties of the second part, and to the grantees’ and parties of the second parts’ heirs and assigns forever, all of the grantors’ and parties of the first parts’ right, title, interest and estate, both at law and in equity, of, in and to, the following described real property, situated in the County of Major, State of Oklahoma, to-wit: SEE EXHIBIT A Together with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging. SUBJECT TO easements, restrictions, mineral conveyances, encumbrances, and any other encumbrances of record. TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above granted premises unto the said grantees and parties of the second part, and to the grantees’ and parties of the second parts’ heirs and assigns forever. In Witness Whereof, the said grantors and parties of the first part hereunto set their hands the day and year above written. Clifton Dewane Wilson Freda Unterkircher Wilson STATE OF OKLAHOMA ) COUNTY OF NOBLE ) ss. Before me, on this 20 day of Nov., 2018, personally appeared Clifton Dewane Wilson and Freda Unterkircher Wilson, husband and wife, to me known to be the identical persons who executed the within and foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that they executed the same as their voluntary act and deed for the uses and purposes therein set forth. Notary Public My commission expires: 4.30.19 EXHIBIT A Buller/Parker Property: The grantors' and parties of the first parts’ interests in surface and mineral interests in and to Lots Eleven (11) and twelve (12) and their surface interests in and to Lot Thirteen (13) in Monahan Addition to the City of Fairview, Major County, Oklahoma, According to the plat thereof Less and Except a (1/2) acre tract of land located in Lot Thirteen (13), More particularly described as follows: Beginning at the Northwest Corner of Lot Thirteen (13) of Monahan’s Addition to the City of Fairview, Major County, Oklahoma, according to the recorded Plat thereof, Thence South 110 feet, thence East 198 feet, thence North 110 feet, thence West 198 feet, to the point of beginning, Containing one half (1/2) Acre more or less W.I.M., Major County, Oklahoma Lovell Property: The grantors’ and parties of the first parts’ interests in surface and mineral interests in and to Northwest Quarter (NW/4) of Section Eleven (11), Township Twenty (20) North, Range Thirteen (13), W.I.M., Major County, Oklahoma Dow Property: The grantors’ and parties of the first parts’ interests in surface interests in and to South Half of the Northwest Quarter (S/2 NW/4), and the Southwest Quarter (SW/4), and the North Half of the Southeast Quarter (N/2 SE/4) of Section Twenty-Seven (27), in Township Twenty-One (21) North, Range Fourteen (14) W.I.M., Major County, Oklahoma Corwin Property: The grantors’ and parties of the first parts’ interests in surface interests in and to Northwest Quarter (NW/4), and the Southeast Quarter (SE/4), and the South Half of the Northeast Quarter (S/2 NE/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28), Township Twenty-one (21) North, Range Fourteen (14), W.I.M., Major County, Oklahoma Speece Property: The grantors’ and parties of the first parts’ interests in surface interests in and to Lots One (1) and Two (2) and the East Half of the Northwest Quarter (E/2 NW/4) of Section Nineteen (19), Township Twenty (20) North, Range Thirteen (13), W.I.M., Major County, Oklahoma Patterson Property: The grantors’ and parties of the first parts’ interests in surface interests in and to Southeast Quarter (SE/4) of Section Eighteen (18), Township Twenty (20) North, Range Thirteen (13) W.I.M., Major County, Oklahoma Cornelson Property: The grantors’ and parties of the first parts’ interests in mineral interests in and to Southeast Quarter (SE/4) of Section Eleven (11), Township Twenty (20), Range Thirteen (13) W.I.M., Major County, Oklahoma (Legal descriptions provided by Clifton Dewane Wilson and Freda Unterkircher Wilson) Jesus Said 'Love Your Neighbor As Yourself' Do not covet your neighbors property. JONES, OTJEN & JEWELL Attorneys at Law 214-A North Independence Post Office Box 472 Enid, Oklahoma 73702 Stephen Jones William Jewell Blake Trekell www.stephenjoneslaw.com (580) 242-5500 Telephone (580) 242-4556 Facsimile W.J. OTJEN, SR. (1880-1973) MERL OTJEN BARNES (1947-1994) Reply to Post Office Box DATE: 02/05/2026 Mr. Tom Edwards 241360 E County Road 52 Fairview, OK 73737 Re: Easement issue Dear Mr. Edwards, My name is Blake Trekell. Our firm has been retained in a legal matter concerning an apparent easement dispute between yourself and Mr. Clifton and Mrs. Freda Wilson in Major County on Sections Twenty-eight (28) and Twenty-nine (29) of Township Twenty-one (21) North Range Fourteen (14) W.I.M.. I have met with the Wilsons and spoken extensively about the matter, of which I am quite certain you are aware, gathering and reviewing all the facts and evidence surrounding the circumstances. It is my belief that the Wilsons have a right to use the access and the easement going to their property based upon the following theories of easements allowed by Oklahoma law: 1) easement by prescription 2) implied easement by prior existing use 3) easement by necessity. Additionally, because of some of the signs you published specifically naming them, my clients would likely have a claim for libel and likely slander based off of untrue verbal communications you have made about them. In those causes of actions we would ask for injunctive relief compelling you to open up the easement and allow them passage to their property and monetary damages including punitive and actual damage including damage to their reputation because of the signs you openly displayed accusing them of a crime, as well as damages brought about by their inability to use their property that access requires crossing yours, as they have been doing without interruption for over thirty (30) years. Once we prevail, we would also petition the court to award the Wilsons their attorney costs and fees associated with any litigation which your actions would cause. During my communication with the Wilsons I gathered that this whole situation may perhaps be a complete misunderstanding, of which actions by you that would incite litigation are unnecessary. Mr. Edwards, my clients have never, not once, suspected you of having anything to do with the disappearance of their cattle. They stressed and made that clear to me. They reported the disappearance of their cattle to the authorities, as any reasonable person would, and the February 5, 2026 Oklahoma Department of Agriculture sent their special agents to investigate the cattle theft. It was the agent investigating the theft who recommended to my clients that they lock the gate which enters and dead ends on their property. Their actions were simply the common sense guidance and instruction of the agent who reasonably believed whoever stole the cattle may likely return to steal more, perhaps believing they were an easy target. The Wilsons never intended to lock you out of their property, as they explained to you that you were welcome to put your lock in line with theirs so you could have full access if you needed to access their property. Not advising you they were locking their property was also not unreasonable as it did not dawn on them that you would need immediate access or that you would construe their actions so incorrectly. Unlike them, you had not been using their property to access yours for the last several decades. Any suggestions or beliefs as to my clients’ intent by locking their gate not in harmony with those that I just described that you believe or feel are beliefs you have developed on your own contrary to the facts, which, understandably, you may not have been fully apprised of at the time. The lock on the gate is to keep a thief off their property and from being able to steal their livelihood, and it is not and never has been believed that you are that thief. My clients must have access to their property. The law allows them access to their property, and it allows them access through the same route they have enjoyed over the last several decades. My clients wish to restore their relationship with you as their neighbor that they have enjoyed since the property was purchased over three decades ago. They attempted to handle this with you before retaining an attorney. They have no issue with you and take no issue with you other than your recent conduct, which we now stand at a crossroads for resolving, or not resolving. I do fear personally, as a former law enforcement officer, that your reaction to their securing the property for the sole purpose of keeping out any would-be cattle thieves may be so unreasonable that it may raise the eye of the special agent investigating the case, but I can assure you my clients have conveyed to him that they have no reason personally to suspect you of any wrongdoing. My clients seek reconciliation with you as their neighbor and access to their property. We hope you respond to their efforts by removing the locks blocking access to their property and by taking down the accusatory signs, naming them, within seventy-two (72) hours of receipt of this letter. Otherwise, my clients will take your inaction as a rejection of their efforts to reconcile with you and will take the legal actions available and at their disposal to regain access to their property. Best, Blake Trekell [email protected] Johnson v. Suttles Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division Four September 29, 2009, Decided; September 29, 2009, Filed Case Number: 105646 Reporter 2009 OK CIV APP 89 *; 227 P.3d 664 **; 2009 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 80 *** ARNOLD JOHNSON and WYNEMA JOHNSON, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. MERLEN SUTTLES and NANCY SUTTLES, Defendants/Appellants. Subsequent History: As Corrected October 22, 2009. This Opinion has been Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Civil Appeals October 22, 2009. Mandate Issued: October 22, 2009. As Corrected November 2, 2009. Prior History: [***1] APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CARTER COUNTY, OKLAHOMA. HONORABLE LEE CARD, TRIAL JUDGE. Disposition: AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. Core Terms easement, tract, easement of necessity, conveyance, service road, servient estate, trial court, unity of title, oil, time of conveyance, grantor, implied easement, weight of the evidence, conveyor, modify, peck, part of the property, upper portion, common law, inaccessible, claimant, site Case Summary Procedural Posture Defendant landowners appealed the order of the District Court of Carter County, Oklahoma, granting plaintiff adjoining landowners an easement of necessity across defendants' property to the upper portion of plaintiffs' land. Overview Plaintiffs purchased land directly east and south of defendants' property. The upper portion of plaintiffs' property was difficult to access due to a waterway. Plaintiffs petitioned the trial court to grant them an easement to use the service road through defendants' property. The trial court found that the tracts of both parties had previously been owned by a single grantor, and unity of title existed despite the fact that each of the parties had purchased their tracts from different immediate grantors. The trial court granted plaintiffs an easement of necessity over the service road. The Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma upheld the finding of unity of title; actual use at the time of the severance was not required to create the easement of necessity. Plaintiffs could not effectively use their property without the easement, and the record did not show that imposition of the easement would create an undue burden upon defendants. Outcome The appellate court modified the trial court's order to (1) require defendants to sign a written agreement authorizing the oil company to leave that portion of the service road used by plaintiffs undisturbed, and (2) to obtain a legal description of the road containing specific metes and bounds. The trial court's judgment was affirmed as modified. LexisNexis® Headnotes Civil Procedure > Preliminary Considerations > Equity > General Overview Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Clearly Erroneous Review Real Property Law > ... > Easement Creation > Easement by Implication > Easement by Necessity _HN1_ When a trial court grants or denies an easement of necessity, the appellate court will examine the record and affirm unless the trial court's decision is found to be against the clear weight of the evidence or contrary to law or established principles of equity. Governments > Courts > Common Law Real Property Law > ... > Easements > Easement Creation > Easement by Implication Real Property Law > ... > Easement Creation > Easement by Implication > Easement by Necessity _HN2_ The common law easement by necessity was based upon the implication of a grant of an easement by the owner of the servient estate when necessity of access to the dominant estate required it. Such a theory requires proof of a common grantor at one time of the two properties since the creation of such an easement is based upon the presumed intent of the grantor to convey a way as well as the property. Real Property Law > ... > Easement Creation > Easement by Implication > Easement by Necessity _HN3_ To show the existence of a common law easement of necessity, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) unity of title; (2) conveyance of part of the land previously held under unity of title; and (3) a resulting necessity for access to the property at the time of its severance. Once granted, an easement of necessity continues as long as the need exists. Real Property Law > ... > Easement Creation > Easement by Implication > Easement by Necessity _HN4_ The term unity of title means that the two tracts must have been owned at some time in the past by the same person. It is not the law that both tracts must have been owned by the same person at the time of conveyance to the owner of the servient estate. Real Property Law > ... > Easements > Easement Creation > Easement by Implication HN5 To establish an easement by implication there must first be a conveyance that divides one ownership into separately owned parts. At the time of the conveyance one part of the property must be being used for the benefit of the other part, creating a quasi-easement. Real Property Law > ... > Easements > Easement Creation > Easement by Implication Real Property Law > ... > Easement Creation > Easement by Implication > Easement by Necessity HN6 Oklahoma courts have clearly distinguished implied easements from easements of necessity. An implied easement requires actual use of one part of the property for the benefit of the other at the time of the conveyance separating the property into two tracts. It presupposes the existence of an obvious servitude on the land which a purchaser could not have taken without notice thereof. Real Property Law > ... > Easement Creation > Easement by Implication > Easement by Necessity HN7 An easement of necessity merely requires the existence of a need for an easement across a defendant's land at the time of the conveyance which separated the parties' tracts. In other words, a claimant must show that his land, or a portion thereof, was inaccessible and in need of an easement at the time of the severance of the two tracts. Actual use at the time of the severance is not required. Real Property Law > ... > Easement Creation > Easement by Implication > Easement by Necessity HN8 A party cannot have a way of necessity through the land of another when the necessary way to the highway can be obtained through his own land, however convenient and useful another way might be. Real Property Law > ... > Easement Creation > Easement by Implication > Easement by Necessity HN9 Using a strict or absolute need standard, a party is not entitled to an easement of necessity unless he has no access whatsoever to his land. Using a reasonable need standard, if a claimant has some access, but the location, condition, or nature of the access renders it inadequate, ineffective, difficult, or excessively costly, he may be entitled to an easement of necessity. Real Property Law > ... > Easement Creation > Easement by Implication > Easement by Necessity HN10 If no use can be made of land conveyed or retained without the benefit of an easement, it is assumed that the parties intended the easement to be conveyed. This is true not only where it is claimed by the conveyor but also where it is claimed by the conveyee. It is assumed that the parties could not have intended that the land retained by the conveyor should be useless in his hands, though the assumption may not have too firm a foundation in fact. The inference as to intention which is made is influenced largely by considerations of public policy in favor of land utilization. Real Property Law > ... > Easements > Easement Creation > Easement by Implication Real Property Law > ... > Easement Creation > Easement by Implication > Easement by Necessity HN11 If the necessity of an easement is such that without it the land cannot be effectively used, nothing less than explicit language in the conveyance negating the creation of the easement will prevent its implication. Real Property Law > ... > Easement Creation > Easement by Implication > Easement by Necessity HN12 The reasonable necessity rule is entirely consistent with Oklahoma's express policy of land utilization. It applies in Oklahoma. Real Property Law > ... > Easement Creation > Easement by Implication > Easement by Necessity HN13 The determination of whether land cannot be effectively used requires an examination of all the facts and circumstances of the case. If some use may be made, or if an alternative to the easement which might otherwise be implied can be secured, the implication becomes subject to control by other circumstances. Thus, the expense and effort necessary to secure a substitute by the conveyor may not be so disproportionate but that it may be assumed he was intended to suffer it, while like expense to the conveyee may warrant the inference that he was not intended to suffer it. Real Property Law > ... > Easement Creation > Easement by Implication > Easement by Necessity HN14 In determining whether land "cannot be effectively used" without the granting of an easement by necessity, a trial court should examine such factors as the location and condition of the land, the cost of access, the financial resources of the applicant, and the burden that such an easement will have upon the servient estate. Civil Procedure > Appeals > General Overview Real Property Law > Encumbrances > Adjoining Landowners > Easements HN15 When an objection is raised regarding the location of an easement, an appellate court must examine whether the easement creates an undue burden upon the servient estate. Burdens on the servient estate include, among other things: (1) decreased property value, (2) increased noise and traffic or interference with the servient owner's peace and enjoyment of the land, and (3) physical damage to the servient estate. Counsel: Derril W. McGuire, Ardmore, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs/Appellees. John D. Otey, OTEY LAW OFFICES, P.L.L.C., Ardmore, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellants. Judges: DOUG GABBARD II, PRESIDING JUDGE. RAPP, J., and FISCHER, J., concur. Opinion by: DOUG GABBARD II Opinion [**666] DOUG GABBARD II, PRESIDING JUDGE: [*P1] ¶1 Defendants, Merlen and Nancy Suttles, appeal the trial court's order granting Plaintiffs, Arnold and Wynema Johnson, an easement of necessity across Defendants' property to the upper portion of Plaintiffs' land. We affirm as modified herein. BACKGROUND [*P2] ¶2 In April 2006, Plaintiffs purchased a 75-acre tract of land located in Carter County, Oklahoma. The tract is located directly east and south of Defendants' property. The southern portion of Plaintiffs' property is accessible from the south by a public road, but the upper portion of the property is difficult to access because a waterway known as Wildhorse Creek flows east and west across the entire tract. [*P3] ¶3 Prior to their purchase, Plaintiffs had leased the land for eight or nine years. They used the upper portion of the property to grow alfalfa, which they baled and [***2] sold as animal feed. They reached this part of the property by traveling on a county section line road along the northern perimeter of Defendants' property almost to its northeast corner, and then traveling on an oil well service road in an east/southeasterly direction across Defendants' property to their present property. Plaintiffs often transported baling equipment over the service road. [*P4] ¶4 The service road passing through Defendants' property was built sometime after Defendants purchased their land in 1994. Dehart Company built it for the purpose of servicing oil well sites in the area. In 2001, Dehart paid Defendants a settlement for a release from claims of surface damages. Defendants claim Dehart also agreed to remove the service road once the oil sites had been abandoned. [*P5] ¶5 Defendants were absentee landowners residing outside the state until 2002 when they moved to Velma, Oklahoma. They have been interested in acquiring Plaintiffs' land, and they started locking the gate at the service road entrance shortly after Plaintiffs bought their property in 2006. [*P6] ¶6 Plaintiffs petitioned the trial court to grant them an easement, alleging that access [**667] to their property was "virtually impossible [***3] and beyond reasonable" except by means of the service road through Defendants' property. Defendants countered that Plaintiffs could create an alternate means of access by building a low-water crossing across the creek. Defendants also argued that Plaintiffs were not entitled to an easement since the service road was not in existence when Defendants and Plaintiffs' parcels were severed from common ownership. [*P7] ¶7 At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found that the tracts of both parties had previously been owned by Pat Peck, that unity of title existed despite the fact that each of the parties had purchased their tracts from different immediate grantors, that Plaintiffs had "no other reasonable means of access to their property except across the serviceable road," and that an easement thereon in favor of Plaintiffs would cause Defendants "minimal" inconvenience. The trial court granted Plaintiffs an easement of necessity over the service road, and stated that it was continuing in nature and transferable to subsequent grantors. Defendants appeal. STANDARD OF REVIEW [*P8] ¶8 **H1** When a trial court grants or denies an easement of necessity, the appellate court will examine the record and affirm [*****4*] unless the trial court's decision is found to be against the clear weight of the evidence or contrary to law or established principles of equity. *Mooney v. Mooney, 2003 OK 51, P 27, 70 P.3d 872, 878; DeWitt v. Cavender, 1994 OK CIV APP 93, P 14, 878 P.2d 1077, 1080*. DISCUSSION [*P9] ¶9 In *Franks v. Tyler, 1974 OK CIV APP 55, P 4, 531 P.2d 1067, 1069* (overruled on other grounds by *Childress v. Jordan, 1980 OK CIV APP 35, 620 P.2d 470*), the *Oklahoma* Court of Civil Appeals explained the theory of common law easements of necessity: *HN2* The common law easement by necessity was based upon the implication of a grant of an easement by the owner of the servient estate when necessity of access to the dominant estate required it. Such a theory requires proof of a common grantor at one time of the two properties since the creation of such an easement is based upon the presumed intent of the grantor to convey a way as well as the property.¹ Generally, *HN3* to show the existence of a common law easement of necessity, a plaintiff must prove the following *elements*: (1) unity of title; (2) conveyance of part of the land previously held under unity of title; and (3) a resulting necessity for access to the property at the [*****5*] time of its severance. 28A C.J.S. Easements § 93 (1996). Once granted, an easement of necessity continues as long as the need exists. *Id.* at § 96. [*P10] ¶10 Here, Defendants' various propositions of error may be grouped into three arguments challenging the sufficiency of Plaintiffs' proof: first, unity of title did not exist because the parties acquired their respective properties from different grantors; second, an easement cannot be granted over the service road because the road was not in existence at time of severance; and third, an easement is not necessary because Plaintiffs have an alternative means of access to their property. 1. Unity of Title [*P11] ¶11 Although Defendants assert there was no unity of title because the parties purchased their respective properties from different grantors, this is not what *HN4* unity of title means. Instead, the term means "that the two tracts must have been owned at some time in the past by the same person. It [*****6*] is not the law that both tracts must have been owned by the same person at the time of . . . conveyance . . . to [the owner of the servient estate]." *DeWitt v. Cavender at P 8, 878 P.2d at 1079* (emphasis and citations omitted); see also *Haas v. Bramon, 1924 OK 500, 99 Okla. 94, 225 P. 931*. ¹ *Franks* also noted that common law easements of necessity are distinguishable from condemnation proceedings for taking private ways of necessity pursuant to *27 O.S.2001 § 6*. Private condemnation proceedings do not, for example, require proof of unity of title. [P12] ¶12 [**668] In the present case, Plaintiffs introduced into evidence a 1946 probate decree which recited that Pat Peck owned both properties at his death. In addition, Plaintiffs testified they acquired title to their property in April 2006 from Carmen Hunsucker, who acquired title from David Gayanich, who in turn acquired title from the Peck estate. Defendants purchased their property in 1994 from Geree Kirkpatrick, the widow of Pat Peck, who also acquired her title from the Peck estate. The clear weight of the evidence supports the trial court's finding that the two tracts had been owned at some time in the past by the same party, Pat Peck, and, therefore, had unity of title. 2. Existence of necessity at time of severance [P13] ¶13 Defendants assert that the trial court erred in granting an "implied easement" because the oil well service road was not in use prior to the conveyance which separated the parties' tracts. They rely on [***7] Story v. Hefner, 1975 OK 115, P16, 540 P.2d 562, 566, for the proposition that HN5 "[t]o establish an easement by implication there must first be a conveyance that divides one ownership into separately owned parts. At the time of the conveyance one part of the property must be being used for the benefit of the other part, creating a quasi-easement." [P14] ¶14 Story and the other cases cited by Defendants concern implied easements, also known as quasi-easements or easements of prior use. HN6 Oklahoma courts have clearly distinguished implied easements from easements of necessity. Mooney v. Mooney, 2003 OK 51, 70 P.3d 872; Jones v. Weiss, 1977 OK 188, 570 P.2d 948; Keller v. Fitzpatrick, 1951 OK 49, 204 Okla. 192, 228 P.2d 367; Gorman v. Overmyer, 1947 OK 136, 199 Okla. 451, 190 P.2d 447; DeWitt v. Cavender, 1994 OK CIV APP 93, 878 P.2d 1077. An implied easement requires actual use of one part of the property for the benefit of the other (such as an access road) at the time of the conveyance separating the property into two tracts. 25 Am. Jur. 2d. Easements and Licenses § 32 (2004); see also Restatement (Third) of Property §§ 2.11 and 2.15 (2000). It presupposes the existence of an obvious servitude on the land which a purchaser could [***8] not have taken without notice thereof. [P15] ¶15 In contrast, HN7 an easement of necessity merely requires the existence of a need for an easement across a defendant's land at the time of the conveyance which separated the parties' tracts. In other words, a claimant must show that his land, or a portion thereof, 2 was inaccessible and in need of an easement at the time of the severance of the two tracts. Blackwell v. Mayes County Util. Servs. Auth., 1977 OK 190, 571 P.2d 435. Actual use at the time of the severance is not required. [P16] ¶16 Here, Plaintiffs sought, and were granted, an easement of necessity. The pertinent question is whether Plaintiffs' property needed an easement at the time of the severance of the two tracts. The trial evidence indicated that Wildhorse Creek has been a permanent waterway intersecting Plaintiffs' parcel for over 100 years. 3 Plaintiffs presented evidence that the creek rendered the upper portion of their land inaccessible, except over the service road. Thus, the [***9] clear weight of the evidence indicates that if Plaintiffs' land is inaccessible, a matter we discuss below, then it was inaccessible at the time of severance. 2The courts have treated partial inaccessibility to land much like total inaccessibility. See Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Way of Necessity Where Only Part of Land is Inaccessible, 10 A.L.R. 4th 500 (1981). 3Witness Curt Howell testified that Wildhorse Creek existed when his family moved to the area over 100 years previously. Aerial and other photographs indicate that the creek has a depth, width, and length indicating a substantial age. 3. Absolute or Reasonable Necessity [*P17] ¶17 Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs failed to prove a strict or absolute necessity for an easement, citing the following language from Haas v. Brammon, 1924 OK 500, P 18, 99 Okla. 94, 225 P. 931, 936: HN8 A party cannot have a way of necessity through the land of another when the necessary way to the highway can be obtained through his own land, however convenient and useful another way might be. [**669] Defendants assert that Plaintiffs had alternate access to the upper portion of their land by building a bridge over Wildhorse Creek from their own (accessible) property, and, therefore, the trial court erred in granting an easement merely because it was inconvenient or costly for Plaintiffs to do so. [*P18] ¶18 This raises the issue of whether Plaintiffs' need for an easement must be absolute or [***10] only reasonable. HN9 Using a strict or absolute need standard, a party is not entitled to an easement of necessity unless he has no access whatsoever to his land. Using a reasonable need standard, if a claimant has some access, but the location, condition, or nature of the access renders it inadequate, ineffective, difficult, or excessively costly, he may be entitled to an easement of necessity. 4 [*P19] ¶19 On its face, Haas v. Bramnon appears to require a claimant to show a strict or absolute need for an easement. In fact, in Story v. Hefner and Keller v. Fitzpatrick, cited above, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that implied easements only require proof of a reasonable need, and distinguished the quoted Haas language as applying to easements of necessity. Nevertheless, in the last 20 years, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has receded from the 1924 Haas language, and has suggested the reasonable need standard also applies to easements of necessity. [*P20] ¶20 Thus, in Wells v. Webb, 1989 OK 61, 772 P.2d 400, [***11] the plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent an adjoining landowner from blocking his use of part of the adjoining landowner's property that had an unopened section line road. After the plaintiff presented his evidence at trial, the trial court sustained a demurrer. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, finding that the plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence to overcome a demurrer, even though his 40-acre tract was not entirely landlocked and was, apparently, accessible by foot. The Court found that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case for an easement of necessity by proving that a portion of his tract was not accessible by automobile or tractor except over the unopened section line. Wells demonstrates that a party may be entitled to an easement of necessity even when he is not entirely landlocked if he has no reasonable access to a portion of his property. [*P21] ¶21 The Supreme Court repeated this principle by affirming the granting of an easement of necessity in the case of Jones v. Weiss, 1977 OK 188, 570 P.2d 948. In that case, the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following language from the Restatement (First) of Property § 476, Comment (g): HN10 If no use can [***12] be made of land conveyed or retained without the benefit of an easement, it is assumed that the parties intended the easement to be conveyed. This is true not only 4 American jurisdictions have been split on whether the rule of strict necessity or reasonable necessity should be applied. See Michael DiSabatino, Annotation, Way of Necessity Over Another's Land, 10 ALR4th 447 (1981). where it is claimed by the conveyer but also where it is claimed by the conveyee. It is assumed that the parties could not have intended that the land retained by the conveyer should be useless in his hands, though the assumption may not have too firm a foundation in fact. The inference as to intention which is made is influenced largely by considerations of public policy in favor of land utilization. * * * _HN11_ If the necessity of an easement is such that without it the land _cannot be effectively used_, nothing less than explicit language in the conveyance negating the creation of the _easement_ will prevent its _implication_. . . . (Emphasis added.) _Id. at P8, 570 P.2d at 949_. _HN12_ The reasonable necessity rule is entirely consistent with _Oklahoma's_ express policy of land utilization. We conclude that it applies in this State. [*P22] ¶22 Comment (g) of the Restatement stresses that_HN13_ the determination of whether land "cannot be effectively used" requires an examination of all the facts and circumstances of the case: If some use may be made, or if an [***13] alternative to the easement which might otherwise be implied can be secured, the implication becomes subject to control by other circumstances. Thus, the expense and effort [*670] necessary to secure a substitute by the conveyer may not be so disproportionate but that it may be assumed he was intended to suffer it, while like expense to the conveyee may warrant the inference that he was not intended to suffer it. Thus,_HN14_ in determining whether land "cannot be effectively used" without the granting of an easement by necessity, a trial court should examine such factors as the location and condition of the land, the cost of access, the financial resources of the applicant, and the burden that such an easement will have upon the servient estate. [*P23] ¶23 Although Defendants argued that Plaintiffs could gain access by building a low water crossing or bridge across Wildhorse Creek, the most conservative estimated cost was $ 25,000 to $ 30,000, approximately half of what Plaintiffs paid for their tract. 5 Moreover, this amount did not include the cost of building a road to it, or of repairing it when it inevitably washes out due to flooding. The clear weight of the evidence supports the trial court's finding [***14] that Plaintiffs did not have reasonably effective access to their land, could not "effectively use" it and were entitled to an easement of necessity. [*P24] ¶24 Defendants also assert that the placement of the easement, at the site of the oil service road, was unreasonable because the service road would eventually be removed by the oil company. _HN15_ When an objection is raised regarding the location of an easement, an appellate court must examine whether the easement creates an undue burden upon the servient estate. _Jones v. Weiss at P 11, 570 P.2d at 950_. Burdens on the servient estate include, among other things: (1) decreased property value, (2) increased noise and traffic or interference with the servient owner's peace and enjoyment of the land, and (3) physical damage to the servient estate. _Burkhart v. Jacob, 1999 OK 11, P 12, 976 P.2d 1046, 1050._ [*P25] ¶25 The determination of whether the easement would cause an undue burden on the servient estate was a question of fact decided by the trial court. As indicated above, we will not reverse the trial 5 The record reflects that Plaintiffs purchased their property in 2006 for $ 700 per acre, for a total purchase price of $ 52,500. court unless its decision is [***15] contrary to the clear weight of the evidence or the law. The record before us does not demonstrate that imposition of the easement at the site of the existing service road will create any undue burden upon Defendants' property. [*P26] ¶26 However, the fact that the service road may be removed by the oil company is a matter not addressed by the trial court. Oklahoma Corporation Commission Rule 165:10-3-17 requires removal of oil service roads and restoration of the property by well operators upon abandonment of wells, unless there is a written agreement with the surface owner to leave the surface in some other condition. 6 Here, the trial court did not impose such a requirement upon the Defendants, leaving open the possibility that Plaintiffs' access would eventually be destroyed. Accordingly, we modify the trial court's order to require Defendants to sign a written agreement authorizing the oil company to leave that portion of the service road used by Plaintiffs undisturbed upon its abandonment of oil the well site(s). [*P27] ¶27 In addition, the lack of a specific metes and bounds description of the road may cause a cloud on Defendants' [***16] title. For this reason, we also modify the trial court's order by directing the parties to either agree to a specific metes and bounds description of the road or, if they cannot agree, Plaintiffs shall be required to obtain a survey of said road containing a specific metes and bounds legal description of the road and shall provide it to the trial court within 60 days for inclusion in a modified journal entry filed in the case. CONCLUSION [*P28] ¶28 For all the reasons set forth above, the trial court's judgment is hereby affirmed as modified. [*P29] ¶29 AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. RAPP, J., and FISCHER, J., concur. ______________________________ 6 The promulgation of this rule is authorized by 17 O.S.2001 § 53.2.