S.G.E. v. CITY OF WATONGA

IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR BLAINE COUNTY STATE OF OKLAHOMA S.G.E., a minor, by and through his parent and next friend, ANDREA LAMBERT, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF WATONGA and MONTY GOODWIN, Defendants. Case No.: CJ-2026-10 ATTORNEY LIEN CLAIMED PETITION COMES NOW the Plaintiffs, S.G.E., a minor, by and through his parent and next friend, Andrea Lambert, and for their causes of action against the Defendants, state the following: PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 1. Plaintiff S.G.E. is, and was at all times relevant herein, a resident of Blaine County, State of Oklahoma, residing with his mother, Andrea Lambert ("Ms. Lambert"). The claims being asserted by S.G.E. are being made through his mother and next friend, Ms. Lambert. 2. Defendant City of Watonga, Oklahoma ("the City"), is a municipality located in Blaine County, Oklahoma. The City provides and employs the Watonga Police Department. ("WPD"). 3. Upon information and belief to be confirmed through discovery, Monty Goodwin ("Goodwin") is a resident of Blaine County, Oklahoma. Defendant Goodwin was, at all times relevant hereto, employed by the City as a police officer with the WPD, acting under color of state law and in the scope of his employment. 4. The acts and injuries that are the subject of this litigation occurred in Blaine County, Oklahoma. 5. On May 30, 2025, prior to initiating this action, Ms. Lambert placed the City/WPD on notice of her intent to file State law claims on S.G.E.’s behalf related to the subject incident, in conformance with the notice provisions of the Oklahoma Government Tort Claim Act (“GTCA”), 51 O.S. §156. The City took no formal action in response, and this action is being filed within 180 days of the denial of Ms. Lamert’s claim, as required by 51 O.S. § 157. 6. This court has jurisdiction, and the venue is proper in Blaine County, Oklahoma. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 7. Paragraphs 1-6 are incorporated herein by reference. 8. S.G.E. was born on October 20, 2008, and was diagnosed with autism at an early age. Like many other autistic children, S.G.E. was diagnosed with ADHD. 9. As a result of his autism, S.G.E. struggled to express himself and communicate his feelings, which often left him frustrated. 10. While S.G.E. has learned to regulate his frustrations over the years, there have been several occasions in the past when he was unable to control his emotions, causing him to become outwardly angry and act out. 11. On several such occasions, Ms. Lambert called 911 for assistance. During these encounters, law enforcement responded, calmed S.G.E., and assisted Ms. Lambert in ensuring that S.G.E. was safe and received the necessary care.¹ 12. A similar situation arose on the morning of June 2, 2024, when Ms. Lambert called the WPD for assistance after S.G.E. became upset when Ms. Lambert took his XBOX away. ¹ S.G. was transferred to an inpatient facility for mental health treatment following several of these incidents. However, unlike the prior occasions, the WPD’s presence on June 2, 2024, was not productive, and instead resulted in injury to S.G.E. 13. On said date, Ms. Lambert took away S.G.E.’s XBOX gaming console, which caused him to become increasingly upset. In his frustration, S.G.E. grabbed a knife and made a vague threat of self-harm. 14. Ms. Lambert, who was recovering from a recent surgery, did not feel capable of handling the situation herself and called 911 for assistance. 15. At or around 7:30 a.m., WPD officers Monty Goodwin and Joaquin Montoya (“Officer Montoya”) were dispatched to Ms. Lambert’s home in response to her 911 call. 16. When the officers arrived, they spoke with Ms. Lambert, who explained the situation and advised that S.G.E. was in a bedroom in the back of the home. 17. The officers then proceeded through Ms. Lambert’s house and made contact with S.G.E., who was standing in his bedroom, unarmed and otherwise non-threatening. 18. Defendant Goodwin made contact with S.G.E., who calmly explained that he was upset that Ms. Lambert had taken his gaming console away, and lashed out. S.G.E. further apologized for his behavior and advised that he did not have any intention of hurting himself. 19. Goodwin informed S.G.E. that he was going to take him into custody to be transferred to a hospital and/or mental health facility due to his statements about wanting to injure himself. 20. S.G.E. informed the officers that he did not want to be taken into custody because that would lead to his being placed in an inpatient facility, which he did not believe was beneficial for him. 21. As the conversation continued, S.G.E. stood near the door of the bedroom, with his back against a wall and his hands behind his back, while Goodwin, who was visibly growing frustrated, stood in the doorway of the room, just feet away from S.G.E. 22. At that time, Goodwin knew that S.G.E., who was just 14 years old, was autistic, unarmed, in an excited state, and did not want to be taken into custody. 23. Despite that knowledge, Goodwin did not request backup or assistance from any trained mental health professionals to assist in taking S.G.E. into custody. 24. Rather, Goodwin attempted to physically take S.G.E. into custody by grabbing for his arms, which were resting behind his back. 25. In response, S.G.E. -- who was just fourteen (14) years old, approximately 5’5 tall, and weighed approximately 240 pounds -- stepped away to avoid Goodwin’s grasp, which caused him to fall backwards onto his bed.2 26. Once on his bed, Goodwin immediately jumped on top of S.G.E., as Officer Montoya ran over to assist. 27. The officers eventually placed S.G.E. in handcuffs, before rolling him over so that S.G.E. was sitting on the floor of his room, with his back up against his bed. Goodwin then attempted to flip S.G.E. onto his stomach 28. When S.G.E. did not immediately oblige, Goodwin struck S.G.E. in the face with a closed fist (3) times, while S.G.E. was sitting on the ground handcuffed. 29. At the time that Goodwin struck S.G.E. in the face, S.G.E. was unarmed, not attempting to flee, and posed no threat of harm to Goodwin or anyone else. 2 Goodwin, on the other hand, was thirty-eight years old and appeared to be physically strong and in excellent physical condition. 30. Goodwin made no effort to temper the severity of the force he employed on S.G.E. 31. S.G.E. was later transferred to Mercy Hospital in Watonga before being transferred to an inpatient facility. 32. As a direct and proximate cause of Goodwin’s use of force, S.G.E. sustained bodily and mental injuries. 33. From the very beginning of the encounter, Goodwin was aware that S.G.E. was autistic, mentally disoriented, such that he was unable to appreciate his situation. 34. Despite that knowledge, Goodwin failed to employ tactics that would have been more likely to resolve the situation without resulting in his violent use of force, such as calling a trained mental health professional, requesting backup, or using de-escalation techniques. 35. It was abundantly clear that S.G.E. was not attempting to injure anyone, posed no imminent threat of serious harm to anyone, and was offering only passive resistance. Based on the totality of the circumstances faced by Defendant Goodwin at the precise moments he used force, S.G.E posed no threat of harm to himself, Goodwin, or anyone else. 36. As such, Defendant Goodwin’s use of force on the Plaintiff constitutes excessive and unreasonable force in violation of the Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights. • City/WPD Policies, Practices, and/or Customs 37. There is an affirmative link between the aforementioned excessive force utilized by Defendant Goodwin and policies, practices and/or customs which the City/WPD promulgated, created, implemented and/or possessed responsibility for. 38. First, the City/WPD, in conformance with its custom or practice, failed to screen and investigate Goodwin before hiring him as an officer with the WPD.3 39. Prior to working for the WPD, Defendant Goodwin was employed as a deputy with the Blaine County Sheriff’s Office (“BCSO”). 40. According to Blaine County Sheriff Travis Daugherty, he demoted Goodwin shortly before he left for the WPD “to a position that wasn’t with the public” due to “a history of complaints.”4 41. Upon information and belief to be confirmed in discovery, the City/WPD was either aware of Goodwin’s prior issues and hired him anyway or failed to conduct an adequate pre-employment investigation into Goodwin before hiring him as a police officer. 42. Either way, the City/WPD knew, or should have known, that Goodwin was unfit to work as an officer and posed a threat to citizens he came in contact with. 43. Second, the City/WPD failed to adequately train its officers, including Defendant Goodwin, in a number of key areas. 44. For instance, the City/WPD failed to ensure its officers considered the totality of the circumstances by accounting for a suspect’s altered mental state when considering,5 by failing to train its officers with respect to, inter alia: ______________________________ 3 See Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1284 (10th Cir. 2019) ("failing to adequately screen job applicants—can also constitute an official policy") (citing Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410–12, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997)). 4 See, Chantelle Navarro, Blaine County DA declines to file criminal charges against Watonga police officer in use of force case, KOCO News, https://www.koco.com/article/watonga-police-officer-use-of-force-da-declines-criminal-charges/61855416 5 See Cardall v. Thompson, 845 F.Supp.2d 1182, 1190 (D. Utah 2012 ("The Tenth Circuit has also stated that ‘a detainee's mental health must be taken into account when considering the officers' use of force....’") (quoting Giannetti v. City of Stillwater, 216 F. App’x 756, 764 (10th Cir. a. How to properly engage and interact with individuals suffering from diminished capacity, as a result of a mental health condition; b. How to accommodate the needs of individuals suffering from diminished capacity during a police-citizen encounter; c. How to properly de-escalate encounters with individuals suffering from diminished capacity, as a result of a mental health condition; d. How to properly assess the need for the use of less lethal weapons in situations involving individuals suffering from diminished capacity, as a result of a mental health condition; e. How to properly communicate to other WPD officers that an individual is suffering from diminished capacity, as a result of a mental health condition; and f. When to request assistance from a mental health professional or other specialized mental health unit when responding to individuals experiencing mental health crises. 45. The City/WPD further failed to train its officers with respect to the use of force on individuals who are handcuffed or otherwise subdued. 46. The Tenth Circuit has “clearly established that officers may not continue to use force against a suspect who is effectively subdued.” Perea v. Baca, 817 F.3d 1198, 1204 (10th Cir. 2016) (collecting cases); see also McCowan v. Morales, 945 F.3d 1276, 1289 (10th Cir. 2019) (“it was clearly established in 2011...that ‘the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of force without legitimate justification, as when a subject poses no threat or has been subdued.’” (citing McCoy v. Meyers, 887 F.3d 1034, 1052 (10th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added in McCowan)). 2007) (“a detainee's mental health must be taken into account when considering the officers' use of force ... under Graham.”). 47. Upon information and belief, the City/WPD failed to train its officers on the Tenth Circuit’s holdings in this regard, which played a causal role in the unnecessary uses of force at issue herein.6 48. Defendant Goodwin’s use of force in this case arose under circumstances that constitute a usual and recurring situation with which WPD officers must deal. It is axiomatic that officers must routinely deal with mentally unsettled citizens like S.G.E. See, e.g., Allen v. Muskogee, Okl., 119 F.3d 837, 842 (10th Cir. 1997) ("it was common for officers to have to deal with mentally ill or emotionally disturbed people and people under the influence of drugs or alcohol."); Finlinson v. Millard Cnty., No. 2:16-CV-01009-TC, 2018 WL 5438436, at *25 (D. Utah Oct. 29, 2018) (encounters with mentally ill people—including civil commitments—are a usual and recurring situation for the Millard County Sheriff's Office."). 49. It was obvious that by failing to train its officers regarding how to interact with mentally disabled citizens, constitutional violations were likely to occur.7 50. Third, Plaintiff alleges that the City/WPD failed to adequately train and supervise Defendant Goodwin, as a matter of custom or practice, despite his known lack of training, and propensity toward violence, and had a history of misconduct during his previous employment with the BCSO. ______________________________ 6 See Gooding v. Ketcher, 838 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1240 (N.D. Okla. 2012) ("there is support for basing an inadequate training claim on a defendant's failure to train officers on relevant case law") (citing Bowen–Soto v. City of Liberal, Kan., No. 08–1171–MLB, 2010 WL 4643350, at *4 (D. Kan. Nov. 9, 2010)). 7 See, e.g., Brown v. Gray, 227 F.3d 1278, 1288-89 (10th Cir. 2000) ("the need for more or different training [wa]s so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the [the WPD] can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need"). 51. The lack of supervision is evidenced by Goodwin’s consistent pattern of misconduct during his brief tenure with the WPD. 52. By way of example, on July 4, 2022, approximately one (1) month after his use of force on S.G.E., Goodwin was involved in a separate, unjustified use of force when he took down a local man who was on an early morning walk with his son.8 53. Then on September 17, 2024, Goodwin shot several dogs from his WPD patrol vehicle, who he believed may have attempted to bite an unknown individual. 54. Even before Goodwin, there were several other instances which illustrate both the breadth of the WPD’s custom and practice of excessive force, as well as the City/WPD’s knowledge of the same. 55. For instance, on August 13, 2019, the then-WPD Chief Shawn Kays punched a non-threatening woman in the face, before twisting her arm to the point that her elbow was dislocated, which led to him being charged criminally. See Cosby v. City of Watonga, et al., United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, Case No. 23-cv-00550-PRW.9 56. Similar to Goodwin, there were allegations that Kays was hired as the WPD police chief despite prior reports of misconduct. 8 See C.J. Ciaramella, Oklahoma Cops Under Investigation for Slamming Innocent Dad to the Ground for 'Suspicious' Walk With Son, Reason, https://reason.com/2024/08/05/oklahoma-cops-under-investigation-for-slamming-innocent-dad-to-the-ground-for-suspicious-walk-with-son/. 9 See, Ashley Holden, Former Watonga Chief Facing Assault And Battery, Burglary Complaints, News 9, https://www.news9.com/story/60fad8a0c8e7e50c01d81792/former-watonga-chief-facing-assault-and-battery-burglary-complaints. 57. Upon information and belief, despite being aware of its failures with Kays, the City/WPD, wholly failed to implement any changes to the screening, supervision, or training it provides to for its law enforcement officers. 58. Then, in May 2022, former WPD officer Jason Porter tased a suspect that was handcuffed to a hospital bed multiple times, which led to Porter being charged with a felony account of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon.10 59. Upon information and belief, the City/WPD did not address the clear inadequacies in how its officers utilize force on (a) mentally disabled/disturbed individuals and (b) individuals that are essentially subdued, despite these prior incidents. 60. The City/WPD knew, must have known, or should have known that -- due to its obviously inadequate hiring, training, and supervision -- unconstitutional conduct toward arrestees/detainees by WPD personnel was probable, but failed to take reasonable measures to alleviate the risks of harm. 61. The City/WPD, through its continued encouragement, ratification, approval, and/or maintenance of the aforementioned policies, customs, and/or practices, in spite of their known and obvious inadequacies and dangers, was deliberately indifferent to S.G.E.’s clearly established constitutional rights. CAUSES OF ACTION COUNT I – EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (As to Defendant Goodwin) 62. Paragraphs 1-61 are incorporated herein by reference. 10 See, Jason Burger, Watonga police officer deployed stun gun on man handcuffed to hospital bed, court documents say, KOCO News, https://www.koco.com/article/oklahoma-watonga-police-officer-charged-tasing-man-handcuffed-hospital-bed/42604553. 63. At the time of the complained of events, S.G.E., as a free person, had a clearly established constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment to be secure in his person and free from objectively unreasonable seizures involving the use of excessive force. 64. Any reasonable police officer knew or should have known of these rights at the time of the complained of conduct as they were clearly established at that time. 65. In the totality of the circumstances, S.G.E. was unarmed, not attempting to evade Defendant Goodwin by flight, and was in no way posing any immediate threat to the safety of himself, law enforcement, or others. 66. Moreover, Defendant Goodwin knew that S.G.E. was suffering from mental health issues, and that his mental capacity was diminished. 67. Nevertheless, Defendant Goodwin intentionally and knowingly applied unnecessary, unreasonable, and excessive force against S.G.E. by striking him repeatedly in the face, while he was handcuffed behind his back. 68. The use of violent force by Goodwin under such circumstances was excessive and objectively unreasonable. 69. At the time of the use of force, Defendant Goodwin failed to utilize lesser means of force to de-escalate, reasonably communicate, and/or control the situation, despite S.G.E.’s obvious disability and Goodwin having plenty of time and opportunity to do so. 70. Even if Defendant Goodwin was justified in stopping, detaining, or otherwise using some level of force during the encounter based on the ambiguity of the situation, the quantum of force used went far beyond that which could be considered reasonably justifiable under the circumstances. 71. Moreover, Defendant Goodwin’s conduct caused or created a situation that necessitated an escalation in the need to use more force that what was necessary. See Allen, 119 F.3d at 840 (“[t]he reasonableness of Defendants’ actions depends both on whether the officers were in danger at the precise moment that they used force and on whether Defendants’ own reckless or deliberate conduct during the seizure unreasonably created the need to use such force.”). 72. Defendant Goodwin’s use of force, as described herein, was malicious and/or involved reckless, callous, and deliberate indifference to S.G.E.’s federally protected rights 73. As a direct and proximate result of Goodwin's unlawful conduct, S.G.E. suffered actual physical injuries, mental and physical pain and suffering, and other damages and losses as described herein, entitling S.G.E. to recover compensatory and special damages in amounts to be determined at trial. 74. Additionally, S.G.E. is entitled to punitive damages on the claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as Defendants’ conduct, acts, and omissions alleged here in constitute reckless or callous indifference to S.G.E.’s federally protected rights. Count II – Municipal Liability (As to the City) 75. Paragraphs 1-74 are incorporated herein by reference. 76. There is an affirmative link between the aforementioned excessive force utilized by Defendant Goodwin and policies, practices and/or customs which the City/WPD promulgated, created, implemented and/or possessed responsibility for. 77. Such policies, customs and/or practices are specifically set forth in paragraphs 37-61, supra. 78. The City/WPD was aware of its deficient policies, practices, and/or customs, due to the prior incidents of excessive force, as referenced, supra. 79. The City/WPD knew, must have known or should have known that -- due its obviously inadequate hiring, training and supervision practices -- unconstitutional conduct toward arrestees/detainees by WPD personnel was probable, but failed to take reasonable measures to alleviate the risks of harm. 80. Thus, the City/WPD has created and tolerated and maintained long-standing, unconstitutional department-wide customs, law enforcement related policies, procedures and practices, and failed to properly train and/or supervise its officers in a manner amounting to deliberate indifference with respect to uses of force. 81. The City/WPD, through its continued encouragement, ratification, approval and/or maintenance of the aforementioned policies, customs, and/or practices; in spite of their known and obvious inadequacies and dangers; has been deliberately indifferent to citizens', including Plaintiff's, health and safety. 82. As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned customs, policies, and/or practices, W.G.E. suffered injuries, unnecessary physical pain, mental and physical pain and suffering, humiliation, embarrassment, and other damages and losses as described herein Count III – NEGLIGENCE (51 O.S. § 151 et seq.) (AS TO THE CITY) 83. Paragraphs 1-82 are incorporated herein by reference. 84. In Oklahoma, a law enforcement officer “is generally said to owe a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct with respect to all risks that make the conduct unreasonably dangerous.” Morales v. City of Oklahoma City ex rel. Oklahoma City Police Dep’t, 230 P.3d 869, 878 (Okla. 2010). Because, however, the act of making an arrest necessarily involves some risk of harm to the arrestee, “a police officer has a special dispensation from the duty of ordinary care not to endanger others.” Id. at 880. 85. In particular, “[a] police officer’s duty … is to use only such force in making an arrest as a reasonably prudent police officer would use in light of the objective circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the arrest.” Id. 86. Here, the City and its employees/agents, including Defendant Goodwin, owed a duty to the S.G.E. to use only such force in securing his cooperation as a reasonably prudent police officer would use in light of the objective circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the incident. 87. Defendant Goodwin breached that duty by using objectively unreasonable and excessive force as described herein, when S.G.E. was subdued and posed him no threat. 88. The City/WPD is statutorily liable for the actions of its employees taken within the scope of their employment, consistent with the provisions of the GTCA. See Nail v. City of Henryetta, 1996 OK 12, 911 P.2d 914. 89. At all pertinent times, Defendant Goodwin was acting within the scope of his employment and, thus, the City/WPD is vicariously liable for his negligent use of excessive force pursuant to 51 O.S. § 151 et seq. 90. As a direct and proximate cause of the City’s actions and conduct, S.G.E. sustained damages, including but not limited to serious bodily injury, pain and suffering, medical expenses, loss of wages, as well as other damages in excess of $75,000.00. WHEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiff prays this Court grant the relief sought, including but not limited to actual and compensatory damages in excess of Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00), with interest accruing from the date of filing suit, the costs of bringing this action, a reasonable attorneys’ fee, along with such other relief as is deemed just and equitable. Respectfully submitted, SMOLEN | LAW, PLLC [Signature] Donald E. Smolen, II, OBA #19944 John W. Warren, OBA #33635 611 S. Detroit Ave. Tulsa, OK 74120 P: (918) 777-4LAW (4529) F: (918) 890-4529 [email protected] [email protected] Attorneys for Plaintiff