Amy Williams v. Tara Elaine Moles

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR CRAIG COUNTY, OKLAHOMA AMY WILLIAMS, an individual, Plaintiff v. TARA ELAINE MOLES, an individual, Defendant Attorneys for Plaintiff HALL, ESTILL, HARDWICK, GABLE, GOLDEN & NELSON, P.C. Joshua Kirk McGill, Esq. (No. 34859) Zachary S. Al-Tabbaa, Esq. (No. 35845) 521 East 2nd Street, Suite 1200 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74120 [email protected] [email protected] Tele: (720) 512-5820 Fax: (918) 594-0505 FILED DISTRICT COURT CRAIG COUNTY, OKLAHOMA RENEE TODD - COURT CLERK MAR 3 1 2026 BY [signature] ▲Court Use Only▲ DISTRICT COURT CRAIG COUNTY, OKLAHOMA DIVISION ____ 210 West Delaware Avenue Vinita, Oklahoma 74301 Hon. ________________________, Presiding CASE NO. CJ-2026-35 VERIFIED PETITION Plaintiff Amy Williams acting by and through the undersigned counsel, respectfully files this Verified Petition against the above-named Defendant. Any averment made herein that is not supported by a specific citation is made upon the information and belief of Plaintiff. Any quotation set forth herein is an averment by Plaintiff, upon information and belief, that such quotation is a true and accurate quotation. In the event of a conflict between the quotation as set forth herein and the actual statement, naturally the actual statement controls. Any information or document referenced herein is not incorporated into this Complaint by reference unless attached hereto as an exhibit or Plaintiff requests that this Court take judicial notice of the same. Instead, such references are an averment by Petitioner, upon information and belief, that such information or document exists and comports with its description herein. Any averment herein related to the law is merely a reference to what Plaintiff believes, in good faith, to be the controlling law. In other words, such an averment is merely a statement of what Plaintiff believes the law is for purposes of clarity and providing proper notice to the Respondents, not an assertion of what the law should be—unless the averment specifically states that Plaintiff is seeking an extension or change in the law. Any reference herein to a list being inclusive (e.g., “including x, y, and z”) is without limitation (i.e. including but not limited to the items in the list) unless specifically stated otherwise. Any reference to a specific day is made upon information and belief that the event referenced occurred on that date. Any reference to a date that is not specific day is made upon information and belief that the event reference occurred on or around (or during in the case of a range of dates) the date stated. Plaintiff intends that this Complaint be read as one complete set of averments supporting the claims set forth herein. Thus, every paragraph of every section herein is expressly incorporated into every other section herein unless such incorporation contradicts another paragraph in a specific claim at issue, in which case that particular incorporation will be limited only to the extent necessary to avoid such a contradiction within that claim. I. THE PARTIES 1. Plaintiff Amy Williams ("Williams" or Plaintiff') is an individual, a citizen of the State of Oklahoma and of the United States, and is a resident of Craig County. 2. Defendant Tara Elaine Moles ("Moles" or "Defendant") is an individual, a citizen of the State of Oklahoma and of the United States, and is a resident of II. JURISDICTION & VENUE A. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 3. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this dispute because the events giving rise to this dispute materially occurred within the State of Oklahoma and involve violations of the statutory and Common Law of this State, over which this Court has general jurisdiction pursuant to the Oklahoma Constitution, as implemented by Title 12, Oklahoma Statutes. B. PERSONAL JURISDICTION 4. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because they are citizens of the State of Oklahoma and material events giving rise to the claims set forth herein occurred in Craig County. C. VENUE 5. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 12 O.S. § 141 because the damages occurred in and resulted from Defendant's use of a motor vehicle in Craig County. III. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS A. THE COLLISION BY DEFENDANT INTO PLAINTIFF'S VEHICLE 6. Amy Williams is a 60-year-old elementary school teacher for Quapaw Public Schools. 7. Williams was born and raised in Vinita and has lived there her entire life. 8. On the evening of Saturday December 13, 2025, at approximately 9:00 PM Central Time, Williams was returning from purchasing Christmas related school supplies for her students and other sundries at the Vinita Walmart. A printout from Google maps showing the location of the incident is below, indicated by the red pin. The Walmart is shown in the upper-right (northeast) corner ("Walmart Flash Deals"). 9. Williams was proceeding south on 7th Street (South 4410 Road) towards the intersection with East Excelsior Avenue (East 269 Road). Excelsior dead-ends into 7th Street at this intersection as indicated with the red pin on the map above. Thus, vehicles traveling on Excelsior must turn either right (south) or left (north) on 7th Street. 11. The view (during the day) from a vehicle traveling south on 7th Street towards the intersection with Excelsior is set forth below from Google Maps. The tan SUV in the photo is properly stopped at the stop sign waiting to turn onto 7th Street. Google Maps  13. A view (moments after the photo above) of a vehicle traveling east on Excelsior towards the same intersection with 7th Avenue is set forth below from Google Maps.  Google Maps 14. There is a stop sign clearly visible on Excelsior controlling traffic turning from Excelsior onto 7th Street. There are no traffic control devices controlling traffic on Excelsior. 15. The tan SUV properly yielded the intersection to the Google Maps vehicle, which turned right (west) onto Excelsior, and the SUV is now making its turn left (north) onto 7th Street. 16. There is no way to travel through the intersection without turning; doing so will cause such a vehicle to drive off the road through the dead-end, down into a ditch and, ultimately, into one of two coppices of trees as set forth in the picture above. 17. The picture below, taken by Google Maps a few moments later, shows the tan SUV completing its turn onto 7th Avenue, and shows the clear sightlines both east through the intersection (showing the dead-end and the trees beyond it), and of traffic coming from the north (traveling south, in the same direction as Williams) on 7th Avenue. ![Picture 1] 18. Thus, even at night a person in a vehicle traveling east on Excelsior has a clear view of: a) the stop sign controlling traffic turning from Excelsior onto 7th Street; b) the fact that Excelsior dead-ends into 7th Street, such that a vehicle must turn onto 7th Street or run off the end of the road; and c) traffic coming from the left (north) southbound on 7th Street through the intersection. 19. Williams had the right of way through the intersection because there is no traffic control device controlling her direction of travel. There was no vehicle in or beginning to enter the intersection at the time that Williams entered the same. 20. Unbeknownst to Williams, Moles was traveling down Excelsior at a high rate of speed (in excess of the posted speed limit), did not stop at the stop sign, and did not yield the right of way to Williams. 21. Indeed, Moles never attempted to make the turn onto 7th Street, nor did she ever hit her brakes to slow her vehicle. Defendant continued past the stop sign and straight into the intersection and, but for the presence of Plaintiff's vehicle, would have driven straight off the end of the road, through the dead-end, and into the ditch and the trees beyond. 22. Thus, the evidence establishes that Moles either did not recognize the structure of the 'T' intersection, or simply ignored it. 23. Williams did not see Defendant's vehicle coming down Excelsior until she saw Defendant's headlights at the instant before impact. Williams did not see that Defendant was not going to stop at the stop sign, and even if she had she was entitled by law to presume that Defendant would stop at the stop sign. 24. Defendant's vehicle struck Williams's vehicle at a 90-degree angle, as set forth in the collision reconstruction in the City of Vinita Police Report, an excerpt of which is set forth below. Unit #2 is Williams' car, Unit #1 is Defendant's car. Not To Scale Ditch Unit #1 where the car ended up Unit #2 where car ended up South 7th street East Excelsior 25. Defendant did not take any action to stop at the stop sign, yield the right of way, attempt to turn onto 7th Street, or avoid the collision. Rather, Defendant drove directly into Williams' car at full speed. 26. Williams acted lawfully, had no last chance of avoiding the collision, and was not at fault in the incident. She was driving down a road she had traveled routinely for decades with no awareness of any threat when her world exploded into chaos and pain. 27. The force of the collision caused the airbags of Williams's vehicle to deploy and the force and impact on Williams's body was violent and extreme. Williams received a blow to the face and head that left her momentarily stunned and confused. Her first recognition was that she was in extreme pain in her right adnominal area and that she could not feel her legs. She was in extreme fear of internal injuries and being unable to move to get herself out of the smoldering vehicle that she feared might catch fire or explode at any moment. 28. Williams experienced severe abdominal pain, dizziness, and nausea that likely arose from the effect of the impact of the seatbelt on a part of Williams's body that was the location of a previous abdominal surgery procedure; that being the abdominal right upper quadrant, epigastric area and periumbilical area. 29. Williams experienced intense head, back and neck pain that was likely associated with a previous surgery in which a tumor and two vertebrae were removed from her thoracic spine, thus creating a weak area that was particularly traumatized by the impact. 30. Williams suffered from neurological symptoms including bilateral ear pain and muffled hearing/tinnitus, at least some of which was caused by barotrauma from the airbag deployment. Initially, Williams feared that she was deaf as she regained consciousness and found herself immersed in silence and completely immobile in the grip of the airbags with the air full of smoke and dust. However, her hearing began to return slowly over the next few hours although a ringing in her ears persisted for weeks thereafter. 31. A witness to the crash, Billy Heard (also a lifetime resident of Vinita and very familiar with the road and the scene of the wreck), was the first person to reach the scene. Billy was traveling in the opposite direction as Williams—north on 7th Street—with his young son in the passenger seat. If Defendant had hurtled into the intersection a few seconds later than she did, her vehicle would have smashed into Heard's vehicle instead of Williams'. For that matter, if there had not been a vehicle to strike when Defendant blew into the intersection, she would have run straight off the road into the ditch and the trees beyond with likely tragic consequences for her and her passenger. As it was, Defendant managed to destroy her automobile, but Williams’ presence in the intersection saved both she and her passenger from the serious injuries or death that would have occurred had they driven off the end of the road. 32. Heard pulled over immediately when he saw the crash, and went to the nearest of the wrecked vehicles, the Defendant’s, and made sure that both Defendant and her passenger were able to extricate themselves from their wrecked vehicle. He next went to Williams’s vehicle and found that Williams was still tightly pinned in the vehicle by the airbags, which were fully deployed. He opened the driver’s door and found the vehicle full of smoke and dust with the Williams semi-conscious and immobile. 33. Fearing that it was dangerous to move the Williams due to her injuries, Heard called 911 and asked for an ambulance to come to the scene. He then asked the Williams if she was okay, and she responded that she was in horrible pain that was apparently most intense on the right side of her abdomen. She said that she could not feel her legs and she wasn’t sure if she could move. She repeatedly asked him to find her phone so she could call her husband. 34. As the airbags began to dis-inflate, Heard decided that he needed to get Williams clear of the smoldering vehicle because the smoke might be an indication of a possible fire that would engulf the vehicle and Williams. Therefore, Heard extricated Williams from the driver’s seat and got her feet out onto the ground where he could drag her away quickly if necessary. 35. Heard found Williams’s phone and helped her call her husband. 36. A responding police officer arrived on the scene a few minutes later, and due to the extreme cold and windy night, he and Heard immediately placed Williams in his patrol vehicle until EMS paramedics arrived to take charge of her. Within a couple of minutes thereafter, an ambulance arrived on the scene. 37. Williams’s husband arrived shortly afterward, and he transported her to the hospital emergency department where she was examined and given a 4mg ondansetron (ZOFRAN) injection, 4mg morphine sulfate injection, iohexol (OMNIPAQUE) 350 MG/ML IV solution 100 mL, orphenadrine (NORFLEX) injection 60mg IV, and acetaminophen (OFIRMEV) IV. 38. The collision caused Williams severe pain in her abdomen, neck and back. Williams suffered severe and persistent pain for weeks thereafter followed by months of declining levels of pain that ultimately became less persistent and more tolerable such that she could return to work and otherwise function in her daily life. 39. Williams is unlikely to fully recover from either her physical or emotional injuries. She suffers from comorbidities of hypertension, high blood pressure and severe anxiety, the latter of which is particularly acute whenever she is in an automobile. Since the subject crash and the ensuing fear, pain and suffering, Plaintiff suffers from Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) that seriously and negatively impacts her health and happiness. B. DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION FOR RUNNING THE STOP SIGN 40. Law enforcement cited Defendant for failing to stop at the stop sign. The City of Vinita Municipal Court subsequently convicted Defendant of Failing to Stop at a Stop Sign in Vinita Police Case No. 2025-143/Municipal Court Case No. 2025-965. 41. The Police Report, written by Officer Colby Tanner, Badge No. 112, states that Defendant admitted that she did not stop at the stop sign and that she went “straight through the intersection”. C. DEFENDANT’S RELEVANT CRIMINAL HISTORY 42. Defendant has a lengthy criminal history, material portions of which are relevant to these proceedings. The portions of her criminal history relevant to the underling automobile collisions are as follows: a. Date of Offense: May 9, 1996. Convicted of Misdemeanor DUI (Alcohol) in violation of 47 O.S. § 761. Tulsa County Case No. TR-1996-7198. b. Date of Offense: February 3, 1997. Convicted of Misdemeanor drug possession in violation of 63 O.S. §§ 2-401 & 2-420. c. Date of Offense: July 4, 1997. Convicted of Felony drug possession in violation of 63 O.S. § 2-402 and Misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of 63 O.S. § 2-402. Tulsa County Case No. CF-1997-553. d. Date of Offense: August 21, 1998. Convicted of Felony drug possession (2nd or greater offense) in violation of 63 O.S. § 2-402, Misdemeanor drug possession in violation of 63 O.S. § 2-402, Misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of 63 O.S. § 2-402, and Misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of 63 O.S. § 2-405. Tulsa County Case No. CF-1998-4406. e. Date of Offense: September 18, 2001. Convicted of Felony drug possession (2nd or greater offense) in violation of 63 O.S. §§ 2-401 & 2-420. Tulsa County Case No. CF-2001-5427. f. Date of Offense: April 27, 2011. Convicted of Misdemeanor DUI (Drugs) in violation of 47 O.S. § 11-902(A)(3). Rogers County Case No. CM-2011-448. 43. Notice is given of Plaintiff's intent to seek the admission of these convictions for purposes of establishing Defendant's impairment. 44. Notice is also given of Plaintiff's intent to seek the admission of these convictions for purposes of establishing Defendant's pattern of reckless behavior for purposes of punitive damages. 45. Defendant has also been convicted of crimes of dishonesty, which may be admissible for purposes of impeachment pursuant to 12 O.S. § 12-2609(A)(2). The portions of her criminal history relevant to impeachment are: a. Date of Offense: July 15, 2001. Convicted of Felony forgery in violation in violation of 21 O.S. §§ 1561–1628. Tulsa County Case No. CF-2001-4194. b. Date of Offense: September 7, 2001. Convicted of Felony forgery in violation of 21 O.S. §§ 1561–1628. Tulsa County Case No. CF-2002-917. 46. Notice is respectfully given to Defendant of Plaintiff's intent to seek the admission of all the convictions set forth above, notwithstanding that they are more than ten years old, pursuant to 12 O.S. § 12-2609(B), for purposes of impeaching Defendant as a witness. D. DEFENDANT WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE 47. Defendant Moles drove straight through the intersection without slowing down or attempting to stop or turn. 48. Had Williams' vehicle not been in the way, Defendant would have driven straight through the intersection, off the end of the road at the dead-end, into the ditch, and—if the ditch did not stop her car—into one of the coppices of trees. 49. Defendant's behavior is not consistent with that of a rational unimpaired driver. Rather, Defendant's behavior is consistent with a person impaired by the influence of drugs and/or alcohol. 50. The Police Report states that one Shirl Lawler was a passenger in Defendant's vehicle at the time of the collision. Lawler is a resident of Vinita and stated to Williams and Heard that she knew that this was a T-intersection but that the Defendant was from out of town and did not know the road or that there was a stop sign. Lawler did not explain why she did not warn Defendant that Defendant was about to drive through a stop sign and into the intersection. 51. Any reasonable person would have so-warned the Defendant—for self-preservation, if nothing else. Therefore, Lawler was either incapable of warning Defendant and/or Defendant was incapable of understanding a warning. 52. Lawler’s maiden name is Shirl Lynn Moles. She is kin to Defendant. 53. Lawler has been convicted of the following felonies and misdemeanors in Oklahoma relevant to these proceedings (either on impairment or to impeach her as a witness) as follows: a. Tulsa County Case No. CF-1992-2633 (misdemeanor concealing stolen property). b. Tulsa County Case No. CF-1992-4142 (felony larceny). c. Tulsa County Case No. CF-1993-4196 (felony false impersonation, misdemeanor DUI, misdemeanor careless driving). d. Tulsa County Case No. CF-1993-5033 (felony escape from jail). e. Tulsa County Case No. CF-1995-6239 (felony drug possession with intent to distribute). f. Tulsa County Case No. CF-1997-1536 (felony check fraud). g. Tulsa County Case No. CF-1997-2834 (felony forgery, felony concealing stolen property). h. Tulsa County Case No. CF-2015-2782 (felony larceny) i. Tulsa County Case No. CF-2017-948 (misdemeanor drug possession). 54. Notice is respectfully given to Lawler of Plaintiff’s intent to seek the admission of all the convictions set forth above, notwithstanding that they are more than ten years old, pursuant to 12 O.S. § 12-2609(B), for purposes of impeaching Lawler as a witness. 55. Notice is also given of Plaintiff’s intent to seek the admission of these convictions for purposes of establishing Defendant and Lawler’s impairment. 56. Law enforcement did not perform a sobriety test on Defendant or Lawler, nor, it appears, did law enforcement perform a criminal records check that would have discovered Defendant and Lawler’s many prior convictions for drug and alcohol offenses—including driving under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol—which would likely have prompted the office to conduct such a check. 57. Accordingly, the evidence—at this early stage of proceedings—is sufficient to conclude that Defendant and Lawler were both under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol and that this impairment materially contributed to Lawler failing to warn Defendant of the upcoming intersection, Defendant failing to stop at the stop sign, failing to yield the right of way, and—ultimately—Defendant colliding with Plaintiff's vehicles and causing her injuries. IV. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 58. To the extent that any of the claims set forth below are contradictory or inconsistent, Williams states that such claims are pled in the alternative as permitted by 12 O.S. § 2008(2). A. CLAIM 1: NEGLIGENCE • Type of Claim: Law • Basis of Claim: Oklahoma Common Law 1. Elements of Claim. 59. The elements of a negligence claim under Oklahoma law are: a) a duty owed by Defendant to Plaintiff; b) breach of that duty; c) damage to the Plaintiff; and, d) causation linking the breach to Plaintiff's damages. Norton v. Spring Operating Co., 2020 OK CIV APP 18, ¶ 12, 466 P.3d 598, 602. 2. Factual averments establishing all elements of the claim. 60. Duty: Oklahoma law imposes a general duty of care on all drivers. a. 76 O.S. § 5(A) provides that "[e]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person." Drivers must accordingly exercise ordinary care in operating their vehicles. b. Each motorist approaching an intersection must act as a reasonably prudent person would under all existing circumstances. Johnson v. Short, 1951 OK 156, ¶ 8, 204 Okla. 656, 657, 232 P.2d 944, 946. 61. Breach: Defendant breached these duties by failing to exercise reasonable care when approaching the intersection. a. A reasonable person would have seen that the road upon which Defendant was driving ended at a dead-end 'T' intersection with the road upon which Plaintiff was driving, and would have taken due care when approaching that intersection because a reasonable person would recognize that they must turn onto the intersecting road and cannot merely continue straight through the dead-end, and that such turn requires due care to yield to traffic on the thru road. b. A reasonable person would have seen that Plaintiff's vehicle had the right of way without any traffic control device impeding her movement and was accordingly entitled to and actually was continuing through the intersection. c. A reasonable person would have stopped at the stop sign as required by law. d. A reasonable person would have yielded the right of way to Plaintiff's vehicle that was already entering the intersection even if there had been no stop sign. e. A reasonable person would have taken evasive action to avoid the collision even after failing to yield the right of way. 62. Causation: Defendant's breach in driving through the stop sign without yielding the right of way to Plaintiff was the actual and proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries. a. Actual Cause (Cause-in-Fact): i. But for Defendant failing to recognize that the road upon which Defendant was driving ended at a dead-end 'T' intersection with the road upon which Plaintiff was driving, failing to recognize that she must turn onto the intersecting road and could not merely continue straight through the dead-end, and failing to recognize that such turn requires due care to yield to traffic on the thru road, Defendant would not have continued through the intersection and struck Plaintiff's vehicle. ii. But for Defendant failing to see that Plaintiff's vehicle had the right of way without any traffic control device impeding her movement and was accordingly entitled to and actually was continuing through the intersection, Defendant would not have continued through the intersection and struck Plaintiff's vehicle. iii. But for Defendant failing to yield the right of way by stopping at the stop sign, Defendant's vehicle would not have struck Plaintiff's vehicle, and Plaintiff would not have been injured. iv. But for Defendant failing to yield the right of way, regardless of the existence of the stop sign, Defendant's vehicle would not have struck Plaintiff's vehicle, and Plaintiff would not have been injured. v. But for Defendant failing to take evasive action to avoid the collision even after failing to yield the right of way, Defendant's vehicle would not have struck Plaintiff's vehicle, and Plaintiff would not have been injured. b. Proximate (Legal) Cause: i. A reasonable person would have foreseen that the road upon which Defendant was driving ended at a dead-end 'T' intersection with the road upon which Plaintiff was driving, and would have taken due care when approaching that intersection because a reasonable person would foresee that they must turn onto the intersecting road and cannot merely continue straight through the dead-end, and that such turn requires due care to yield to traffic on the thru road. Thus, a reasonable person would have foreseen that failing to recognize the structure of the intersecting roads and the reasonable care required to navigate the same could cause a collision with Plaintiff's vehicle. ii. A reasonable person would have foreseen that the presence of the stop sign controlling the intersection from Defendant's direction of travel and Plaintiff's vehicle passing through the intersection required due care when approaching the intersection. iii. A reasonable person would have foreseen that failing to yield the right of way by stopping at the stop sign would cause Defendant's vehicle to collide with Plaintiff's vehicle. A reasonable person would have accordingly stopped at the stop sign and yielded the right of way to Plaintiff. iv. A reasonable person would have foreseen that failing to yield the right of way would cause Defendant's vehicle to collide with Plaintiff's vehicle. A reasonable person would have accordingly yielded the right of way to Plaintiff even without a stop sign. v. Defendant’s breaches set in motion a chain of events leading to the injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening cause that a reasonable person would not have foreseen. vi. Defendant’s failure either to recognize that Plaintiff’s vehicle was already lawfully in the intersection such that Defendant could not enter the intersection without colliding with Plaintiff’s vehicle and, independently, Defendant’s failure to stop at the stop sign were, accordingly, independent proximate causes of Plaintiff’s injuries. 63. Damages: Plaintiff suffered physical injuries, and emotional distress caused by those physical injuries, from the collision. These injuries include both new injuries (e.g. blunt force trauma, whiplash), and exacerbation of the Plaintiff’s existing medical conditions. B. CLAIM 2: NEGLIGENCE PER SE • Type of Claim: Law • Basis of Claim: Common Law 1. Elements of Claim. 64. The elements of negligence per se are that: a) Defendant violated a statute or regulation; b) the violation caused the injury to the Plaintiff; c) the injury was of the type intended to be prevented by the statute; and, d) the Plaintiff is one of a class of persons the statute or regulation was intended to protect. Norton, 2020 OK CIV APP 18, at ¶ 33, 466 P.3d at 608. 2. Factual averments establishing all elements of the claim. 65. Violation: Defendant violated 47 O.S. § 11-403(B) by failing to stop at the stop sign. a. The City of Vinita Municipal Court convicted Defendant of failing to stop at the stop sign. b. The statute creates a two-part duty: first, the driver must come to a complete stop, and second, the driver must yield to vehicles already in or approaching the intersection. c. After stopping at a stop sign, a driver is not privileged to enter intersection as long as automobiles were approaching on through street so close as to constitute an immediate hazard and could not acquire right of way by merely entering intersection ahead of motorist on through street. Ruth v. Reeves, 1959 OK 85, ¶ 6, 340 P.2d 452, 453. Instead, the driver must assess whether approaching vehicles constitute an immediate hazard before proceeding. d. Defendant violated both parts of the statutory duty because the Defendant did not come to a complete stop—or even attempt to stop—and the Defendant failed to yield to Plaintiff’s vehicle that was already in the intersection. 66. Causation: Plaintiff suffered injuries and Defendant’s failure to stop at the stop sign was the actual and proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. a. Actual Cause (Cause-in-Fact): But for Defendant’s failure to stop at the stop sign, Plaintiff would not have been injured. b. Proximate (Legal) Cause: A reasonable person would have foreseen that failing to stop at the stop sign could cause their vehicle to collide with a vehicle already in the intersection. Therefore, Defendant’s breach of the statute by filing to stop at the stop sign set in motion a chain of events leading to the injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening cause that a reasonable person would not have foreseen. Defendant’s failure to stop at the stop sign was, accordingly, the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. 67. Legislative Intent: The Legislature intended to protect drivers passing through an intersection controlled by a stop sign on the intersecting street by requiring that the driver on the intersecting street controlled by the stop sign come to a complete stop and yield the intersection to thru traffic. a. When one highway is protected by stop signs at an intersection “the rule that first automobile to enter intersection has right of way does not ordinarily apply, and motorist on boulevard is entitled to assume that driver on intersecting highway will obey stop sign and yield right of way.” Guegel v. Bailey, 1947 OK 273, ¶ 7, 199 Okla. 441, 442, 186 P.2d 827, 829. See also Fauks v. Garrett, 1951 OK 209, ¶ 26, 205 Okla. 129, 133, 235 P.2d 921, 925 (ditto). b. The Legislature thus intended that drivers on the thru street have a right to assume compliance with stop signs because stop signs are intended to protect them from vehicles entering the intersection without yielding the right of way. 68. Protected Class: Plaintiff was of the class the Legislature intended to protect because Plaintiff was the driver on the thru street who had the right to assume that Defendant would stop at the stop sign. C. CLAIM 3: NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS • Type of Claim: Law • Basis of Claim: Oklahoma Common Law 1. Elements of Claim. 69. The elements of a negligence claim under Oklahoma law are: a) a duty owed by Defendant to Plaintiff; b) breach of that duty; c) damage to the Plaintiff; and, d) causation linking the breach to Plaintiff's damages. Norton v. Spring Operating Co., 2020 OK CIV APP 18, ¶ 12, 466 P.3d 598, 602. 70. The additional elements for negligent infliction of emotional distress are: a) that the Plaintiff was as direct victim of the underlying tort; and, b) that the Plaintiff's emotional distress must be accompanied by or results in some physical injury or physical manifestation. Ridings v. Maze, 2018 OK 18, ¶ 7, 414 P.3d 835, 838 (direct victim); Kraszewski v. Baptist Med. Ctr. of Oklahoma, Inc., 1996 OK 141, ¶ 6, 916 P.2d 241, 246. 71. Oklahoma does not recognize a separate claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress—Oklahoma law subsumes emotional distress into the underlying negligence claim. However, for purposes of clarity and because emotional distress damages are sought for both Plaintiff's claim for negligence and for her claim for negligence per se, Plaintiff pleads the claim separately. 2. Factual averments establishing all elements of the claim. 72. Duty: As set forth above, Oklahoma law imposes a general duty of care on all drivers. This duty of care includes not causing emotional distress to other drivers by unlawfully colliding with their vehicles. 73. Breach: Defendant breached this duty for the reasons set forth under both claims above. 74. Causation: a. Actual Cause (Cause-in-Fact): But for Defendant's breach of her duties of care set forth above, she would not have caused her vehicle to collide with Plaintiff's vehicle, would not have injured Plaintiff, and therefore would not have inflicted emotional distress upon Plaintiff. b. Proximate (Legal) Cause: A reasonable person would have foreseen that the breaches of Defendant's duties would cause a collision as set forth above, a reasonable person would further have foreseen that such a collision was likely to injury Plaintiff, and a reasonable person would finally have foreseen that such injury was likely to inflict emotional distress upon Plaintiff. i. Defendant’s breaches set in motion a chain of events leading to the infliction of the emotional distress upon Plaintiff in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening cause that a reasonable person would not have foreseen. ii. Defendant’s failure either to recognize that Plaintiff’s vehicle was already lawfully in the intersection such that Defendant could not enter the intersection without colliding with Plaintiff’s vehicle and, independently, Defendant’s failure to stop at the stop sign were, accordingly, independent proximate causes of Plaintiff’s emotional distress. 75. Damages: Plaintiff suffered emotional distress in the form of mental anguish from the collision. 76. Direct Victim: Plaintiff was the direct victim of the underlying tort. 77. Physical Injury or Manifestation: Plaintiff suffer emotional distress caused by the physical injuries inflicted upon her by Defendant’s negligence. Independently, Plaintiff’s emotional distress resulted in physical manifestation of her mental anguish including sleeplessness, nausea, changes in appetite, difficulty driving due to stress (e.g. shaking, lightheadedness). D. CLAIM 4: PUNITIVE DAMAGES—RECKLESSNESS • Type of Claim: Law • Basis of Claim: 23 O.S. § 9.1(B) 1. Elements of Claim. 78. The elements of a punitive damages claim for reckless behavior under Oklahoma law are that Defendant acted with reckless disregard for the rights of others because either a) Defendant was aware of an unnecessary risk of injury; or, b) Defendant was culpably indifferent to an unnecessary risk of injury. Thiry v. Armstrong World Indus., 1983 OK 28, ¶ 26, 661 P.2d 515, 518. 79. Additionally, the trier of fact must consider the following factors (if relevant) pursuant to 23 O.S. § 9.1(A): a. The seriousness of the hazard to the public arising from the defendant's misconduct. b. The profitability of the misconduct to the defendant. c. The duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it. d. The degree of the defendant's awareness of the hazard and of its excessiveness. e. The attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the misconduct or hazard. f. In the case of a defendant which is a corporation or other entity, the number and level of employees involved in causing or concealing the misconduct. g. The financial condition of the defendant. 2. Factual averments establishing all elements of the claim. 80. Clear and convincing evidence establishes that Defendant acted with reckless disregard for the rights of Plaintiff because: a. Defendant was actually aware that proceeding through the intersection without stopping at the stop sign and/or yielding the right of way to Plaintiff created an unnecessary risk of injury to Plaintiff—but Defendant failed to stop and yield the right of way anyway. b. Alternatively, a reasonable person would have been aware that proceeding through the intersection without stopping at the stop sign and/or yielding the right of way to Plaintiff created an unnecessary risk of injury to Plaintiff—but Defendant consciously disregarded this risk by not paying any attention to the risk—as evidenced by the fact that Defendant did not even recognize the risk to herself from proceeding straight through the intersection which, as noted above, would have resulted in her crashing through the dead end had she not collided with Plaintiff's vehicle first. c. Alternatively, a reasonable person would have been aware that proceeding through the intersection without stopping at the stop sign and/or yielding the right of way to Plaintiff created an unnecessary risk of injury to Plaintiff—but Defendant was unable to properly assess the risk because Defendant was knowingly and intentionally under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol at the time. 3. Factual averments establishing the relevant factors. 81. Factor 1 (Public Hazard): The Defendant's misconduct in failing to even slow down before driving into an intersection, coupled with the Defendant's long history of the abuse of drugs and alcohol—in particular while driving a motor vehicle—establish that the Defendant's instant misconduct created a serious hazard to the public—of which Plaintiff was simply the most recent direct victim. 82. Factor 2 (Profitability): Irrelevant as the Defendant's misconduct was not financially related. 83. Factor 3 (Duration): Defendant has repeatedly violated Oklahoma law regarding drugs and alcohol generally—and being under the influence of drugs and alcohol while driving specifically—for almost thirty years. Defendant has engaged in drug and alcohol abuse far more than the instances in which she was caught by law enforcement and convicted by the Oklahoma courts and has successfully concealed her violations of Oklahoma law except for the enumerated instances. Therefore, the duration of the misconduct is lengthy and Defendant has made substantial (successful) efforts to conceal it. 84. Factor 4 (Awareness): Defendant was aware that failing to exercise reasonable care while driving, and in particular when approaching intersections, created a hazard to the public. Defendant was aware that using drugs and/or alcohol while operating an motor vehicle is dangerous. 85. Factor 5 (Attitude): The Defendant's lengthy criminal record of drug and alcohol abuse—and while driving a motor vehicle in particular—establishes that Defendant has a cavalier attitude about her behavior and recklessly disregards the threat to public health and safety cause by her behavior. 86. Factor 6 (Corporate Issues): Irrelevant because the Defendant is a natural person, not a legal entity. V. DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY Williams respectfully demands a trial by jury for all issues so triable. VI. REMEDIES AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF 87. Williams respectfully requests that the Court award her all of the remedies available to her at law or equity under the claims set forth above. 88. Compensatory Damages. Williams respectfully requests that the Court award her compensatory damages to the maximum extent permitted by law for each and every one of his claims set forth herein including the following: a. Williams respectfully requests that the Court award her economic damages for the lost property and income in an amount to be determined by the trier of fact. b. Williams respectfully requests that the Court award her non-economic damages including pain and suffering, emotional distress, and loss of enjoyment of life caused or exacerbated by Defendants’ misconduct set forth herein, in an amount to be determined by the trier of fact. 89. Consequential Damages. Williams respectfully requests that the Court award her the damages arising as a consequence of Defendants’ misconduct, in an amount to be determined by the trier of fact. 90. Punitive Damages: Williams respectfully requests that the Court award her punitive damages pursuant to 23 O.S. § 9.1(B), in an amount to be determined by the trier of fact, but not to exceed the greater of actual damages or $100,000. 91. Interest. Williams respectfully requests that the Court award her pre and post-judgment interest on all claims to the maximum extent permitted by law. 92. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs as an Element of Damages. Williams respectfully requests that the Court award her all of his attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in the investigation and attempts to remediate the misconduct of Defendant as an element of her compensatory damages pursuant to the wrong of another doctrine. 93. Statutory Attorneys’ Fees & Costs. Williams respectfully requests that the Court award her attorneys’ fees and costs to the extent permitted by statute. 94. The total amount of damages sought is in excess of the amount required for diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 95. Plaintiff Amy Williams respectfully requests that this Court order the relief set forth above and any other remedy in law or at equity that this Court in its discretion finds just and equitable. Respectfully submitted this 31st day of March 2026. HALL, ESTILL, HARDWICK, GABLE, GOLDEN & NELSON, P.C. [Signature] Dr. Joshua Kirk McGill, Esq. Attorneys for Petitioner VERIFICATION BY PETITIONER I, Amy Williams, being of sound mind and legal age, state as follows: I am the Petitioner in this action. I reviewed the facts set forth in the foregoing Petition and they are true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters stated on information or belief, and as to those matters, I reasonably believe them to be true. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Oklahoma that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. Amy Williams, Petitioner Date: 3.30.26 ATTORNEY'S VERIFICATION I, Joshua Kirk McGill, of the firm Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C., and an Officer of this Honorable Court state pursuant to District Court Rule 4 of the Rules for District Courts of Oklahoma that I read the above and foregoing, and all allegations and facts contained therein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Respectfully submitted this 31st day of March 2026. HALL, ESTILL, HARDWICK, GABLE, GOLDEN & NELSON, P.C. [Signature] Dr. Joshua Kirk McGill, Esq. Attorneys for Petitioner